

Report N° 20
MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP
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____________________________________________________________________________
SELECTIVE GENOCIDE
IN
BURUNDI
By
Professor René Lemarchand and David Martin
CONTENTS
Historical
Note 3
Map
4
Part One: by Prof. René Lemarchand
5
Footnotes to Part One
23
Appendix
1
26
Appendix
Il
27
Part Two: by David
Martin 29
Footnotes to Part
Two 33
Bibliography
35
List of Films
36
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
- 2 -
From the Universal
Declaration Article 1
of Human
Rights,
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights.
adopted by the General
Assembly They are endowed with
reason and conscience and should act
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
of the United Nations
on 10th December
1948:
Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of
the
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent
trust, non‑self governing or under any other limitation of
sovereignty.
Article 10
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a
fair and public hearing
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination
of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against
him.
Article 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expression;
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without inter
ference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Article 20
(l ) Everyone has the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly
and association.
(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
- 3 -
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
HISTORICAL NOTE
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Rwanda Urundi (1899 1962)______________________________
Burundi and Rwanda became part of German East Africa in 1899, at the zenith
of colonial expansion in Africa. In 1916, during World War I, Belgian forces
from the former Belgian Congo defeated the Germans and occupied Burundi and
Rwanda. In 1923, Burundi and Rwanda became the Belgian mandated territories
known as Rwanda-Urundi and were administered as a single unit. In 1946, the
territories came under the United Nations Trusteeship Council, with Belgian
administration. Limited self government was initiated, which culminated in
the attainment of full independence for Urundi in 1962 as the Kingdom of
Burundi, under King Mwambutsa IV. Between 1963 and 1964, during a succession
of short lived governments, the monetary customs union with 'twin sister'
Rwanda was dissolved, and Rwanda gained her independence from Belgium.
Rwanda and Burundi had been closely bound economically and otherwise to the
Belgian Congo (now Zaïre), and each was managed and administered during the
colonial period by Belgian officials. Events in one country never failed to
have serious repercussions in the other. In each country, there has been a
long standing history of violent rivalry between the Hutus and the Tutsis.
In Rwanda between 1955 and 1958, Tutsi extremists, viewing Belgian political
reforms as a threat, repressed the Hutu movement; in fact, they murdered
several Hutu leaders. In 1959, however, the Hutus struck back and in a
bloody revolt overthrew the Tutsi minority. Indeed, Tutsis suffered heavy
casualties; it is reported that approximately 120,000 fled to Burundi and
other neighbouring countries.
In 1960, leaders of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU) established a
provisional government. In 1961, Belgium recognized the PARMEHUTU regime,
but the United Nations, hoping to preserve the ethnic economic union of
Burundi and Rwanda after independence, ruled it unlawful and ordered free
elections. These elections resulted in an overwhelming PARMEHUTU victory,
and in 1962 a United Nations resolution ended the Belgian trusteeship and
granted Rwanda full independence.
In Rwanda in 1962, the Hutus expelled the Tutsi minority in a successful
coup. In Burundi, however, the dominant Tutsi minority has been able to stay
in power in spite of attempted coups by the Hutus by controlling the police,
the military, and other vital organizations of the government.
In 1963, there was an abortive Tutsi invasion in Rwanda, which originated
from Burundi with the collaboration of some Rwanda Tutsis. The result was
disastrous for the Tutsis. In the massacre that followed, as many as 12,000
Tutsis in Rwanda were killed. A renewed and intensified Tutsi exodus from
Rwanda began, and the relationship between Burundi and Rwanda deteriorated
accordingly.
It should be repeated that one can understand the factors contributing to
hostilities within each country and also between the countries when one
bears in mind that each country is controlled by the rival tribal ethnic
group Rwanda by the Hutus, and Burundi, despite the fact that the population
is about 85 per cent Hutu, by the Tutsis.
[ __William J. Butler and George Obiozor, 'The Burundi Affair 1972', IDOC
N. America, 1973 ]
___________________________________________________________________________________________
- 4 -

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
- 5 -
SELECTIVE GENOCIDE IN BURUNDI
______________________________________________________________________________________________
PART ONE: BY PROF. RENE LEMARCHAND
______________________________________________________________________________________________
There are few parallels to the human holocaust that took place in Burundi
in 1972 in the wake of a tortuous competitive struggle between the country's
two major ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi . Scarcely noticed (let
alone understood) by public opinion anywhere, the killings are
conservatively estimated to have caused between 80,000 and 100,000 deaths.
Approximately 3.5 per cent of the country's total population (3.5 million)
were physically wiped out in a period of a few weeks. In comparative terms
this is as if England had suffered a loss of 2 million or the United States
about 8 million people. To speak of "selective genocide"*' to describe the
outcome of such large‑scale political violence seems scarcely an
exaggeration.
What the long‑term consequences will be for Burundi society as a whole is
impossible to determine. That the country has undergone something of a
metamorphosis as a result of these events is nonetheless undeniable. It has
become the only state in independent black Africa to claim the appurtenances
of a genuine caste society; a country in which power is the monopoly of a
dominant ethnic minority (Tutsi) representing less than 15 per cent of the
total population. On the basis of cultural and regional criteria alone, this
percentage might drop to less than 4 per cent. Racial
differences aside, the nearest parallel to this situation is provided by
South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories of Angola and
Mozambique. The pattern of dominance extends to virtually all sectors of
life, restricting access to material wealth, education , status and power to
representatives of the dominant minority. For anyone even remotely familiar
with the relatively open and flexible system of stratification that once
characterized Burundi society the
transformation is little short of astonishing.
The full story of what is now piously referred to in Bujumbura as "
les évènements" will probably never be known. The chain of
events leading to the crisis is as complex as the motives which prompted
each community to decimate the other. Sorting out truth from rumour is made
more difficult still by the intensity of feelings displayed by participants
and observers alike over the atrocities committed by each side, the mixture
of fact and fiction conveyed through official statements, and the reluctance
of eyewitnesses to report what they saw. Nonetheless, there is enough
evidence available to produce a reasonably accurate account of the
circumstances that led to the massacre, and in so doing to dispel some of
the more prevalent misconceptions about Burundi society and the roots of
its recent agony.
The Setting: The Country and its People
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Situated in the Central African rift valley, in the very heart of the
continent, Burundi is roughly the size of Belgium (11,000 sq. miles). Along
with Rwanda, its neighbour to the north, it has one of Africa's highest
population densities (185 per square mile in 1955). The growing pressure of
over‑population on the land, together with the general scarcity of natural
resources, lie at the root of the country's economic and social problems.
What mineral resources exist, aside from small deposits of cassiterite, have
yet to be exploited, and much of the economy consists of subsistence
agriculture. With the recent discovery of substantial nickel deposits in the
southeast the economic picture may change drastically in years ahead; so
far, however, no concrete steps have been taken to tap this otherwise
promising industrial potential. Coffee is the main cash crop, generating
approximately 80 per cent of the country's foreign exchange (the equivalent
of about $14 million annually), to which must be added such marginal crops
as tea, cotton and rice. Agricultural output is as yet incapable of meeting
the demands of Burundi's fast‑growing population, let alone of yielding the
surplus production required for rapid economic growth.
Economic scarcity is of course as much of a reality to‑day as it was in
precolonial and colonial times, when Burundi was just one of several
traditional kingdoms spread throughout the interlacustrine zone.
_____________________________
*
For footnotes to Part One see pages
23,24,25
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
- 6 -
To day, however,
perceptions of economic scarcity are increasingly filtered through the prism
of regionalism and ethnicity, thus adding a radically different dimension to
the political environment. To appreciate the significance of this
transformation, at least passing reference must be made to Burundi's
traditional system of social stratification, one of the most complex and
least understood in the whole of Africa.
The standard image of Burundi society conveyed by much of the colonial
literature is that of an ethnic pyramid in which the cattle herding Tutsi,
representing 14 per cent of the population, held the commanding heights of
power and influence; next in rank came the Hutu agriculturalists, forming
the bulk of the population (85 per cent); at the bottom of the heap stood
the pygmoid Twa, a group of relatively little significance numerically (1
per cent) and otherwise. Presumably reinforcing this hierarchy of rank and
privilege were the physical characteristics commonly attributed to each
group: Proverbially tall and wiry, the Tutsi have been said to "possess the
same graceful indolence in gait which is peculiar to Oriental people"(2);
the Hutu, on the other hand, were seen as "a medium sized type of people,
whose ungainly figures betoken hard toil, and who patiently bow themselves
in abject bondage to the later arrived yet ruling race. the Tutsi".(3)
However satisfying to most European observers, such simplicities can only
convey a highly distorted view of Burundi's traditional social system. Not
only do they conceal the existence of major differences within each group,
but they also tend to exaggerate the depth of cultural discontinuities among
them. These distortions are closely connected. Neglect of intra ethnic
cleavages is liable to obscure the basis for cross ethnic links among each
group at the same time that it reduces their respective physical and
cultural characteristics to a parody of reality.
Attention must be drawn, first, to the existence of two separate categories
of Tutsi the 'lower caste' Tutsi Hima group, and the 'higher caste' Tutsi
Banyaruguru, literally, "those who came from the north". Note, however that
the term ruguru has other connotations, meaning "from above", and hence from
regions of high altitude or, figuratively, from high ranking status, i.e.
"close to the Court". Outside observers have unduly emphasized the
geographical derivation of the term, to the point: *of equating all
Banyaruguru with northern Tutsi, which is far from being the case; the
Banyaruguru are found in both northern and southern provinces, and this is
also true of the Hima. At the time of writing (1974) the present Governor of
the Ruyigi province is a de frocked Anglican deacon named John Wilson
Makokwe, a Hima from Buhiga, a northern locality. To assume that the Hima
are inevitably from the south and the Banyaruguru from the north, as many
observers have been prone to do, would be a gross exaggeration. The former
are said to have migrated into the country from the eastern borderlands in
the 17th or 18th century, about two or three centuries later than the
Banyaruguru, who generally hold them in deep contempt, supposedly because of
their 'upstart' attitudes and innate resourcefulness. Nevertheless it is the
'lower caste' Tutsi Hima from the south who are politically dominant, "The
Himas" writes Father Rodegem, "seem gifted for leadership and direct
action",(4) a statement wholly consonant with the emergent pattern of
leadership in contemporary Burundi: a substantial number of civilian and
military elites are recruited from the Hima stratum, and the President of
the Republic (Michel Micombero) is himself of Hima origins. The Banyaruguru,
by contrast, though represented in the government are virtually powerless.
Cutting across this and other cleavages are different social rankings
attached to the various patrilineages (imiryango) within each group, Tutsi,
Hutu and Twa. The usual distinctions are between the 'very good' families,
the 'good' families, those that are neither good nor bad and bad. No less
than forty three different patrilineages thus enter into the Tutsi
Banyaruguru segment, each in turn falling into a specific ranking of social
prestige. In this fashion lineage affiliations could substantially rectify
the formal rank ordering established through ethnic divisions. The degrees
of social distance within the Tutsi stratum, for example, were at times far
more perceptible and socially significant than ethnic differences between
Hutu and Tutsi. This multiplicity of reference group identifications within
the same broad ethnic stratum has created the basis for potential conflicts
among clans, families and lineages; yet the sheer fluidity of such
identifications is also the source of considerable ambiguity as to how one
ought to be defined in terms of clan or family affiliations. This very
ambiguity in turn may help to mitigate intra group conflict. A case in point
is the so called Basapfu 'clan'. This is how Father Rodegem explains the
origins of the Basapfu:
__________________________________________________________________________________________
-7-
Tutsi
of high ranking status. They initially came from Hima Clan. But for some
reason tradition has failed to ascertain, the King one day decided that they
should all be exterminated. He entrusted this task to the Abongera clan, who
made a clean sweep of the Abasapfu cattle, plundered their crops, set fire
to their kraals and killed whoever stood in their way. One of the survivors
was a small boy, who had found refuge behind a reed screen (sapfu) After the
raiders had left, he was discovered by some passers by who decided to take
him to King Ntare. The latter kept him at his court under his protection and
called him Musapfu to commemorate his adventure.(5)
Whether the Basapfu are actually of Hima origin is open to doubt. The
historical evidence suggests that they may have been of Banyaruguru origin.
The significant point is that today the Basapfu identify themselves, and are
often identified by others, as being neither Hima nor Banyaruguru. They are
just referred to as Basapfu, as if they formed yet another reference group
within the Tutsi stratum. This, and the fact that they are more or less
evenly spread throughout the country, is what later enabled some of their
representatives to act as the arbiters of regional conflict, and indeed of
Hima Banyaruguru conflict. For if the incumbent elites are largely drawn
from the Bururi based Hima led faction, within this faction some Basapfu
hold key positions within the government and the army.(6)
A final point to note is that neither Hutu nor Tutsi hold traditional claims
to authority. The real holders of power in the traditional society were the
princes of the blood, or ganwa. Because of the special eminence conferred
upon them by the accidents of history, they became identified as a separate
ethnic group, whose power and prestige ranked far above that of ordinary
Tutsi. They formed the core of the political elites and as such held most of
the chiefly positions available under the monarchy. Despite or because of
this, they never stood as a very cohesive group. Intra ganwa rivalries are
indeed a recurrent theme of Burundi's pre colonial history. Out of the
competing claims of rival dynasties bitter feuds periodically broke out
among the representatives of different 'Houses', culminating in the middle
of the 19 th century in a major struggle between the sons of Mwami (King)
Mwezi Kisabo (1852 1908) and the descendants of the previous incumbent,
Mwami Ntare Rugaamba (1795 1852). Temporarily held in check but by no means
dissipated by the spread of the colonial pax, the late fifties saw a sudden
resurgence of these antagonisms. Even at this late date political conflict
did not express itself in ethnic terms, but in the form of factionalism
between representatives of opposed unilineal descent groups.
What gave a measure of unity and cohesiveness to this otherwise highly
fragmented social order is that below the ganwa stratum no single line of
cleavage could be said to govern the allocation of social status, wealth or
power. Ethnic divisions were largely irrelevant to the distribution of
social prestige, and of only marginal significance with regard to wealth.
And although power was in theory the monopoly of the princes, the record
shows that subchiefs and palace officials were sometimes recruited from
among Hutu and Tutsi. What is more, the competitive relationships which
developed among the princes made it imperative for them to seek the support
of both Hutu and Tutsi hence substantiating Simmel's observation that "conflict
may also bring persons and groups together which otherwise have nothing to
do with each other". In this case, however, Hutu and Tutsi were not nearly
as compartimentalized as the foregoing might suggest. Through the
institution of clientship (bugabire) Hutu and Tutsi were caught in a web of
interlocking relationships extending from the very top of the social pyramid
to its lowest echelons, with the Mwami acting as the supreme Patron which in
turn underscores the unifying role of the monarchy, both as a symbol and an
institution. Through the use of specific symbols, ceremonies and rituals the
monarchy imposed itself as a major focus for popular loyalties. No other
source of legitimacy was as compelling as the Royal Drum (Karyenda) in
holding society together.
The point of this discussion is that although the traditional society
contained a great many potential sources of conflict, in practice conflict
was seldom if ever activated along ethnic lines. To view the recent
holocaust as "an extreme case of the old African problem of tribalism”8 is
indeed difficult to square with the realities of traditional Burundi
society. If the term "tribalism" has any meaning in this context it is a
very recent phenomenon, traceable to the social transformations introduced
under the aegis of the colonial state and the consequent disintegration of
those very structures and mechanisms that once gave cohesiveness to society
as a whole.
______________________________________________________________________________________
- 8 -
Dimensions of
Conflict
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
In its most acute and devastating manifestations the Hutu Tutsi conflict was
the last in a series that spread over a period of at least twelve years,
covering almost as wide a range of potential oppositions as the traditional
society had to offer. Grafted onto this were the tensions arising from the
introduction of new forms of political self expression, i.e., parties, trade
unions and parliamentary institutions. Out of this combi nation of
traditional and modern types of opposition developed an extraordinary hybrid
and complex polity.
The introduction of the vote in 1956, six years before independence,
initiated a process of political mobilization which gradually reached every
sector of society, activating one group after another, pitting princes
against princes, monarchists against republicans, army men against civilians,
north against south,Hutu against Tutsi . At first, traditional cleavages
tended to act as so many breakwaters, allowing the political mobilization of
one group at a time. In contrast to what happened in Rwanda, where the
mobilization of the Hutu masses was greatly facilitated and accelerated by
the existence of a sharp, vertical split between the Tutsi aristocracy and
the Hutu masses, in Burundi the mobilization of the population along ethnic
lines was significantly delayed by the complexity of the traditional social
system, and by the fact that the monarchy was relatively free from ethnic
bias. Even when ethnic loyalties were stirred into action, this did not
eliminate the play of narrower loyalties. One of the most
striking aspects of the country's recent political evolution is the extent
to which ethnic self perceptions have tended to coexist with, and at times
to become subordinate to, residual attachments to the region or to the clan.
As environmental threats shifted from the ethnic to the regional or clanic
level, corres¬ponding shifts of identification occurred among political
actors.
This said, it is only fair to recognize that the seeds of ethnic conflict
were planted long before the occurrence of violence. Tempting though it may
be to emphasize the traditional dimensions of the recent slaughter, the
evidence on this score is very scanty. Meyer's statement that "as long as
the Batussi [sic] are masters in the country, spiritual and cultural
progress is impossible for the Barundi people, for it is only the present
low position of the Bahutu, kept in seclusion for centuries, that ensures
the Batutsi their dominance"(9) does not seem too convincing as an argument,
confusing as it does political and social (or economic) dominance while
failing to distinguish between a potential basis for conflict and conflict
itself. As we already stressed, although the traditional society offered a
potential basis for ethnic conflict, it never experienced such conflict on a
scale even remotely approaching what happened after independence.
Of far greater relevance is the process of social transformation set in
motion during and after the colonial interlude. The external dimensions of
this phenomenon are especially important to bear in mind, in at least two
senses. The Rwanda revolution, for one thing, had a decisive psychological
impact on ethnic self perceptions in Burundi. The coming to power of Hutu
politicians in Rwanda led many of their kinsmen in Burundi to share their
political objectives, in turn intensifying fears of ethnic domination among
the Tutsi of Burundi. Thus by giving the Burundi situation a false
definition to begin with, a definition patterned on the Rwanda situation,
Hutu politicians evoked a new behaviour both among themselves and the Tutsi
which made their originally false imputations true. Ethnic conflict thus
took on the quality of a "self fulfilling prophecy".(10)
The next point is in the nature of a qualification to the foregoing: in some
respects the Burundi situation had already been defined by the Belgian
colonizer as one approximating to Rwanda, with the result that something of
a caste structure had already begun to emerge during the colonial period.
Long before aspiring Hutu politicians sought to emulate the goals and
strategies of their ethnic brothers across the border, Belgian policies in
Rwanda served as a model for colonial administrators in Burundi. It was both
simpler and more efficient to view Burundi as consisting of a Tutsi
aristocracy and a Hutu peasantry and pursue a policy of indirect rule that
would maintain the dominance of one over the other. Few efforts were made
during the colonial period to extend educational facilities to the Hutu
masses, or for that matter to provide them with what few opportunities were
available for a political apprenticeship. Student enrolment at the Ecole
des Frères de la Charité (better known as the "Groupé Scolaire "
of Astrida ) between 1946 and 1954 shows a clear predominance of Tutsi over
Hutu a disproportion which becomes even more striking of course in the case
of Rwanda (see table over).
__________________________________________________________________________________________
- 9 -
Table 1
Ethnic Distribution of Student Enrolment at the Groupe Scolaire (1946-54)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year*
Tutsi
Hutu
Rwanda
Burundi
Congolese
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1946
44
1
8
1947
42
2
10
1948
85
2
11
2
1949
85
5
9
1953
68
3
16
1954
63
3
16
3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Enrolment figures for 1950 52 unavailable; the data above is drawn from the
enrolment records of the Groupe Scolaire at Astrida (now Butare).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Likewise, the conciliar organs set up in 1962 at the countrywide and
district (or territoire) levels, known respectively as the Conseil
Supérieur du Pays (CSP) and the Conseils de Territoire (CT), were
largely dominated by Tutsi or ganwa elements. A study published in
1959 gives the following ethnic breakdown for each set of institutions:
Table 2
Ethnic Distribution of Seats in CSP and CT: Burundi and Rwanda (1959)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Institution*
Ethnic Distribution
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tutsi (or ganwa) Hutu
Total
CSP
Rwanda
31
2
32
Burundi
30
3
33
CT
Rwanda
125
30
155
Burundi
112
26
138
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*CSP: Conseil Supérieur du Pays; CT: Conseils de Territoire. Source: Aloys
Munyangaju, L'Actualité Politique du Ruanda-Urundi (Bruxelles:
1959), p.20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The result is that on the eve of independence relatively few Hutu could
claim the status of a modern élite, and those who did were all the more
anxious to translate their egalitarian commitments into reality. Yet
precisely because of the nature of their commitments, their access to
positions of authority could only be viewed with the greatest suspicion by
the Tutsi minority. Extension of the vote, on a per capita basis,
evoked similar apprehensions. Just as social equality spelled the end of
Tutsi supremacy, majority rule for many Tutsi was seen as synonymous with
Hutu rule.
Even in its most restrictive sense (implying equal representation of ethnic
interests in key governmental and bureaucratic posts) equality never became
a reality of post independence politics. A mere glance at the ethnic
distribution of top civil service positions in 1965 shows the extent of
Tutsi predominance in the political system (see Table 3 following).
_________________________________________________________________________________________
- 10 -
Table 3
Ethnic Distribution of Top Ranking Civil Service Positions, July 1965
Ministries and Directions* Ethnic
Distribution
Ministries and Directions Ethnic Distribution
Ganwa Tutsi Hutu Other
Ganwa Tutsi Hutu Other
Prime Ministership
Justice (Secretariat)
Director General (DG)
1
DG
1
Directors (D)
2
D
3
Deputy Directors (DD)
1 1
DD
4 1
Total
3 2
Total
7 2
Finance
Information
DG
2
DG
1
D
1 2
DD
1
DD
3
Total
3 5
Total
2
Economic Affairs
Social Affairs
DG
1
DG
2
D
2 1
D
2 2
DD
1
DD
2 1
Total
4 1
Total
4 5
Agriculture
Foreign Affairs
DG
3
DG
1
D
4 1
D
3 1 1
DD
2 1
DD
2 1
Total
9 2 &n