POUR MIEUX COMPRENDRE LE JEU 
SUBTIL DE L' EXTRÊME-DROITE BURUNDAISE:  SOJEDEM

"Solidarité jeunesse pour la défense des Minorités"

"Youth Solidarity for the Defence of the Minorities"

Bilal Luqman, AGNews 2002

A) le masque de l'homme criminel en "homme honorable".

- Prenons l'exemple de M. Deo Niyonzima   (SOJEDEM):

Son passée	- Deo Niyonzima était un moine dominicain. - Président du SOJEDEM.
1993 : Assassinat du Président NDADAYE.	- Déogratias Niyonzima, a Roman Catholic Dominican brother who was excluded from the religious order in 1995 because of his SOJEDEM activities
Aujourd'hui (2001-2004)	-  (Si c'est lui ou son Suzie :  (voir photo)) Pastor  Evangelist of Bujumbura , (Born 1965), Deogratias NIYONZIMA , President & Legal Representative Christian Community Development Burundi P.O.Box 6972 Bujumbura BURUNDI, AFRICA Office: +257-249220 Mobile: + 257-979036 E-mail: gdeniy@yahoo.com

B )   Sources :

• Burundi: Quand le génocide et des crimes contre l'humanité deviennent un"fonds de commerce" Document CAAB N° 2 Novembre 1999

Le président de l'association "Solidarité Jeunesse pour la Défense des Droits des
Minorités" (SOJEDEM), l'ex-candidat prêtre dominicain Déogratias Niyonzima, a
publié en mai 1999 une "Alerte au Peuple Tutsi"(Voir en Annexe) dans laquelle il appelle tous les Tutsi à se liguer contre le major Pierre Buyoya et ses alliés du  "FRODEBU Génocidaire" (le terme revient 8 fois sur une page) contre les Batutsi de 1993 à nos jours. On rappellera pour mémoire que la SOJEDEM est l'une des milices tutsi très impliquées dans l'organisation des "villes mortes" à Bujumbura qui ont fait beaucoup de morts Hutu, spécialement parmi les cadres de cette ethnie

• Burundi: Armed groups kill without mercy

The Front de la Jeunesse Patriotique (FJP), Front of the Patriotic Youth, is reportedly the youth wing of the Parti pour le redressement national (PARENA), National Recovery Party, of former President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza. The FJP is reportedly led by Maxime Tuhabonye. The Association des anciens militaires (ASSAM), Association of Veteran Soldiers, a legally recognized association, has been accused of involvement in assassinations of prominent members or allies of FRODEBU. Tutsi leaders have formed other groups which are thought to be fronts for underground armed groups. These include SOJEDEM which is led by Déogratias Niyonzima, a Roman Catholic Dominican brother who was excluded from the religious order in 1995 because of his SOJEDEM activities. Another group is the Association des forces pour le salut national (AFOSANA), Association of Forces for National Salvation. Members of these groups and others have been recruited privately by prominent Tutsi for their protection or for attacking their opponents. Their victims include unarmed civilians. New Hutu armed groups have also emerged since October 1993, partly in response to attacks by government soldiers, often accompanied by Tutsi armed gangs. Hutu armed groups appear to have support from among Hutu political leaders and government officials, some of whom have subsequently left Burundi to join some of the armed groups. For example, many of the Hutu and Tutsi leaders of the CNDD were former government and FRODEBU officials. Tutsi leaders and members of the security forces often accuse Hutu leaders who protest against human rights violations by government forces of supporting Hutu armed groups. In most cases there is no proof of such support. Government soldiers, often with Tutsi armed groups, attacked pockets of Hutu resistance in Bujumbura. From late 1994 onwards they carried out counter-insurgency operations known as "disarmament" operations, using automatic weapons, grenades and rockets. Houses were looted and set ablaze. Hundreds of Hutu civilians were killed and
thousands forced to flee Hutu-dominated suburbs such as Kamenge and Kinama. Hutu   Amnesty International 12 June 1996 AI Index: AFR 16/08/96

• Lien entre la police et l'E.D.B.

"The University of the Burundi capital of Burumbura was the scene of massive killings of students by other students on June 11, 1995, Jean Hélène reported for Le Monde (Guardian Weekly, June 25, 1995):
- That evening, a group of armed members of the United Youth for Defending Minority Rights (Sojedem), set up by Father Deo Niyonzimana, wrecked a fête at the Kamenge secondary school (Kamenge is a Hutu district of the capital, editor's note). The result: four killed, all pupils belonging to associations working for peace.
Shortly afterwards, Tutsi students attacked their Hutu fellow students. Under the eyes of the policemen assigned to protect the university campus, they killed about 40 students.
Dismas, who escaped, said the killing went on all night:
- They stabbed the Hutus they found in their rooms. I hid until dawn, then ran all the way to Kamenge, the only place where I feel safe. I´ll never go back to the university."

• Lien entre les leaders politiques , les hommes d'affaires, les forces de sécurités  TUTSI   et     l'E.D.B.

"In the violence which followed the coup attempt and the assassination of President Ndadaye in October 1993, a new Tutsi armed group known as Sans défaite (Without Defeat) was formed. One of its leaders is said to be Jean-Pierre Nyamoya. Other groups such as the Sans capote (Without Condoms) reportedly rape women before killing them. Tutsi armed groups are organized and financed by Tutsi political leaders, businessmen, and serving and retired members of the security forces. Apart from a few mentioned below, most political leaders deny association with the armed groups. However, many of the political leaders who are accused of supporting these armed groups often say the Tutsi armed groups exist and act to protect Tutsi civilians. The Front de la Jeunesse Patriotique (FJP), Front of the Patriotic Youth, is reportedly the youth wing of the Parti pour le redressement national (PARENA), National Recovery Party, of former President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza. The FJP is reportedly led by Maxime Tuhabonye. The Association des anciens militaires (ASSAM), Association of Veteran Soldiers, a legally recognized association, has been accused of involvement in assassinations of prominent members or allies of FRODEBU. Tutsi leaders have formed other groups which are thought to be fronts for underground armed groups. These include SOJEDEM which is led by Déogratias Niyonzima, a Roman Catholic Dominican brother who was excluded from the religious order in 1995 because of his SOJEDEM activities. Another group is the Association des forces pour le salut national (AFOSANA), Association of Forces for National Salvation. Members of these groups and others have been recruited privately by prominent Tutsi for their protection or for attacking their opponents. Their victims include unarmed civilians."

• Le lien entre Bagaza (Parena), Déo Niyonzima (SOJEDEM)  et les milices d'E.D.B.: les Sans-Echecs (1993) 

"La branche armée du PARENA, dont le nom n'a pas encore été révélé de façon officielle, est constituée d'une force estimée à environ 7000 combattants, exclusivement recrutés au sein de l'ethnie Tutsi. La moitié de ces forces provient des actuelles forces armées burundaises, l'autre moitié est en entraînement en Uganda et aurait été recrutée au sein des rangs du mouvement radicaliste de jeunes Tutsis du nom de SOJEDEM, dirigé par Déo Niyonzima, lui même en exil en Uganda.   Il est difficile d'imaginer une éventuelle collaboration entre cette coalition PARENA-SOJEDEM et les mouvements armés Hutu. Des sources très bien documentées semblent indiquer que c'est la SOJEDEM, par ces milices appelées SANS-ECHEC, qui serait responsable de la paralysie institutionnelle qui a suivi l'assassinat des deux présidents Melchior Ndadaye et Cyprien Ntaryamira, tous des Hutus, ainsi que l'épuration ethnique des quartiers à majorité Hutu et de l'université."

• Le lien entre Bagaza (Parena), Déo Niyonzima (SOJEDEM)  et les milices d'Extrême-Droite Rwandaise. 

"In August, after more than three years' detention, the verdict was announced in a trial of political opponents linked to the Parti pour le redressement national (PARENA), National Recovery Party, and Solidarité jeunesse pour la défense des droits des minorités (SOJEDEM), Youth Solidarity for the Defence of Minority Rights. The defendants had been accused of involvement in a plot to assassinate President Buyoya. Many were tortured. Six defendants received sentences of 10 years' imprisonment and two were acquitted. Another detainee who had been charged with a lesser offence had already been released. Just weeks after the verdict, all but one of the convicted prisoners, Emmanuel Manzi, a Rwandese national, were conditionally released."

• Le lien entre l'Eglise catholique Burundaise et l'E.D.B.

"Bagaza has been outspoken in his criticism of both the coup, stating that it would not resolve Burundi's problems, and the military's choice of Buyoya as leader. A spokesperson for Bagaza told AFP that other Tutsis arrested included Bagaza's nephew Innocent Sabiyumva, Colonel Pascal Ntako, and Deo Niyonzima. Deo Niyonzima, formerly a Dominican monk, is the head of the organization Youth Solidarity for the Defence of the Minorities (SOJEDEM), a radical Tutsi movement influential among young Tutsis. On Friday, the intelligence service was also reported to have held 22 members of the SOJEDEM executive committee for questioning. No arrests were reported in Hutu circles."

• Le lien entre les autorités burundaises - militaires et judiciaires mais aussi ceux de la  cour Constitutionnel -  et  l'E.D.B.: SOJEDEM (une complicité) mais aussi avec le PRP et le RADDES.

24. The Special Rapporteur was relieved to find that the "dead town" operation, of which he had had a foretaste in Bujumbura at the end of his stay, and which had been organized following the defection of the above­mentioned parties calling for the replacement of the President of the Republic at the end of 1995 and the strike order issued by the SOJEDEM and other extremist groups, had not finally achieved the destabilization of the country through violence and that the situation had remained calm in the localities of Gitega and Ngozi, despite the work stoppage observed on 15 January 1996. Before leaving Burundi, the Special Rapporteur noted the firmness shown by the Burundi authorities in stationing large numbers of troops along the main roads of the capital. It remains to be seen whether these recent developments mark a real turning point in the political life of the country or whether they amount only to a delaying action.

25. On the other hand, the Special Rapporteur was disturbed to learn that those same authorities had released, on about 10 February, the President of SOJEDEM and the President of the Conseil national du personnel de l'enseignement secondaire (CONAPES), who had been the originators of many tracts calling for the removal from office of the President of the Republic, after arresting them in mid­January and thenceforth detaining them at the Mpimba central prison in Bujumbura. He hopes this decision does not mean that the Burundi judicial authorities are renouncing their intention of taking appropriate judicial action against the distributors of illicit tracts prejudicial to State security and public order. The Special Rapporteur is also very surprised that the respective Presidents of PRP and RADDES, placed under house arrest during this same period, should have had their freedom of movement restored two days before the release of the President of SOJEDEM. He further stresses that these events are closely linked to the consideration of the complaint launched by SOJEDEM with the Constitutional Court, which must shortly decide the question of the unconstitutionality of the appointment of the President of the Republic, designated under the Convention of September 1994.

• Scènes du baptême dans le lac Victoria .  / ENGLISH

Ils ont reçu une visite d'un Pastor DEOGRATIAS NIYONZIMA du Burundi qui a appris que je serais en Ouganda par la communication de E-mail et ai été déterminé à venir et visiter tandis que j'étais en Ouganda. Il a apporté avec lui un autre Pastor du Burundi et d'un de Jinja. Ils espèrent visiter avec beaucoup du même Pastors l'année prochaine.

They received a visit from one Pastor DEOGRATIAS NIYONZIMA from Burundi who learned I would be in Uganda through e-mail communication and was determined to come and visit while I was in Uganda. He brought with him another Pastor from Burundi and one from Jinja. They are hoping to visit with many of the same Pastors next year.

TEXTE EN ANNEXES :

SOLIDARITE JEUNESSE POUR  LA DEFENSE DES DROITS DES  MINORITES ' SOJEDEM'


ALERTE AU PEUPLE TUTSI

Il est extrêmement urgent de comprendre et de tirer les conclusions conséquentes des informations ci-dessous :

Après avoir constaté avec amertume que les délégués présents à  Arusha qui ne sont pas membres ou aliés du FRODEBU-GENOCIDAIRE  n'entendent pas que le Major BUYOYA dirige la transition après les
négociations d'Arusha, des membres de ce groupe se sont misérablement  lamentés auprès des Ambassadeurs qui les ont toujours soutenus en ces termes :

1. Aucun Hutu ne peut plus accepter de diriger le Burundi avant que  l'Armée actuelle ne soit réduite à sa plus simple expression.
2. Tous les Batutsi opposés à BUYOYA présents à ARUSHA sont d'un  caractère tellement intransigeant qu'ils ne pardonneront pas les cadres administratifs du temps du génocide de 1993. Personne, par conséquent,
ne doit être accepté comme Président de transition après ARUSHA. 
3. Les faiblesses de BUYOYA sont en même temps les meilleurs atouts du  FRODEBU GENOCIDAIRE :

- Seul BUYOYA est capable d'affaiblir les BATUTSI en les divisant.
Chose qu'il a bien réussie : l'union des BATUTSI aurait été catastrophique pour le programme politique du FRODEBU GENOCIDAIRE.
- Seul BUYOYA sait se faire obéir par les présumés assassins de NDADAYE  et du même coutp, grâce au commandement exercé par les coupables,  mettre à genou la redoutable Armée.
- BUYOYA est le seul homme politique prétendu tutsi qui accepte des  compromis uniquement en faveur du FRODEBU GENOCIDAIRE. Aucun Tutsi, même un de ceux-la accusés du meurtre de NDADAYE n'aurait accepté le partenariat politique avec Léonce NGENDAKUMANA et les autres du même
acabit.
- BUYOYA a accepté de démenteler l'Armée actuelle ouvement et ce  endéans cinq ans, date après laquelle le programme politique du FRODEBU  GENOCIDAIRE peut reprendere normalement et cette fois-ci de manière
décisive.
- Non seulement BUYOYA est forcément favorable au FRODEBU GENOCIDAIRE, mais le deuxième homme du pays sera nécessairement un membre du FRODEBU GENOCIDAIRE. Donc, d'une pierre, deux bons coups.
En conclusion, les membres du groupe ci-haut cités ont décidé de  supplier la Communauté Internationale de les aider pour imposer le Major BUYOYA comme Président de transition après les accords d'ARUSHA.

Chaque membre de la SOJEDEM sait bien qu'avec le Major BUYOYA, on  reprend le génocide comme en 1988 de NTEGA-MARANGARA, les massacres de  BUJUMBURA en 1991, l'unité taillée à la mesure du dictateur de 1992, les élections ethnistes de 1993, des coups d'Etats aux finalités  catastrophiques et le génocide contre les Batutsi de 1993 à nos jours.


A BON ENTENDEUR, SALUT. UNIS PAR L'INTELLIGENCE, LE COURAGE ET LE SACRIFICE, NOUS VAINCRONS.


Pour la SOJEDEM  NIYONZIMA Déogratias

Burundi-Rébellion:
À Arusha, la délégation du PARENA confirme l'existence d'une milice destinée
à renverser le régime du Major Buyoya.
 

Nairobi, le 7 Novembre 1998, (Great Lakes Press). - Dans notre dépêche du 6 août dernier, nous avions révélé que l'ancien dictateur burundais, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, serait en train d'entraîner une milice tutsi pour renverser le régime du Major Buyoya. C'est à Arusha lors de la troisième session des négociations que l'un des proches collaborateurs de Bagaza a confirmé l'existence d'une branche armée du PARENA.

"Il (Buyoya) ne cédera jamais à aucune pression sur papier. Il ne pourra jamais quitter le pouvoir autrement que par
la force et nous avons les moyens militaires pour y arriver", a confié, énigmatique, un des responsables politiques du PARENA (Parti pour le redressement national).

De sources irréfutables, GLP a obtenu des informations selon lesquelles Bagaza aurait rencontré certains leaders des mouvements rebelles hutu pour leur proposer "une collaboration politique et militaire".

La branche armée du PARENA, dont le nom n'a pas encore été révélé de façon officielle, est constituée d'une force estimée à environ 7000 combattants, exclusivement recrutés au sein de l'ethnie Tutsi. La moitié de ces forces provient des actuelles forces armées burundaises, l'autre moitié est en entraînement en Uganda et aurait été recrutée au sein des rangs du mouvement radicaliste de jeunes Tutsis du nom de SOJEDEM, dirigé par Déo Niyonzima, lui même en exil en Uganda.

Il est difficile d'imaginer une éventuelle collaboration entre cette coalition PARENA-SOJEDEM et les mouvements armés Hutu. Des sources très bien documentées semblent indiquer que c'est la SOJEDEM, par ces milices appelées SANS-ECHEC, qui serait responsable de la paralysie institutionnelle qui a suivi l'assassinat des deux présidents Melchior Ndadaye et Cyprien Ntaryamira, tous des Hutus, ainsi que l'épuration ethnique des quartiers à majorité Hutu et de l'université.

À Arusha, l'ancien dictateur Bagaza participe aux négociations de paix sur le Burundi par le biais de deux délégations distinctes: une délégation à titre d'ancien chef de l'État, et une autre délégation à titre de leader d'un parti politique, le PARENA. Une fois que la branche armée de son mouvement sera officialisée, Bagaza aura un autre avantage d'être invité aux discussions informelles, généralement secrètes, que le médiateur et une équipe restreinte a l'habitude de tenir avec les groupes armés, à savoir: le gouvernement (armée burundaise), le CNDD, le FROLINA et le PALIPEHUTU. Ces discussions informelles touchent généralement des propositions concrètes en rapport avec les forces de défense et de sécurité, et un éventuel accord pour un cessez-le feu permanent.

Copyright ©1998 Great-Lakes-Press. All rights reserved.
To receive our news wire, please send your e-mail to: gl_press@videotron.ca. If this item is redistributed,
published or used for broadcast, the content must not be changed and credit must be given to:
Great-Lakes-Press

Burundi-Rébellion:
À Arusha, la délégation du PARENA confirme l'existence d'une milice destinée
à renverser le régime du Major Buyoya.
 

Nairobi, le 7 Novembre 1998, (Great Lakes Press). - Dans notre dépêche du 6 août dernier, nous avions révélé que l'ancien dictateur burundais, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, serait en train d'entraîner une milice tutsi pour renverser le régime du Major Buyoya. C'est à Arusha lors de la troisième session des négociations que l'un des proches collaborateurs de Bagaza a confirmé l'existence d'une branche armée du PARENA.

"Il (Buyoya) ne cédera jamais à aucune pression sur papier. Il ne pourra jamais quitter le pouvoir autrement que par
la force et nous avons les moyens militaires pour y arriver", a confié, énigmatique, un des responsables politiques du PARENA (Parti pour le redressement national).

De sources irréfutables, GLP a obtenu des informations selon lesquelles Bagaza aurait rencontré certains leaders des mouvements rebelles hutu pour leur proposer "une collaboration politique et militaire".

La branche armée du PARENA, dont le nom n'a pas encore été révélé de façon officielle, est constituée d'une force estimée à environ 7000 combattants, exclusivement recrutés au sein de l'ethnie Tutsi. La moitié de ces forces provient des actuelles forces armées burundaises, l'autre moitié est en entraînement en Uganda et aurait été recrutée au sein des rangs du mouvement radicaliste de jeunes Tutsis du nom de SOJEDEM, dirigé par Déo Niyonzima, lui même en exil en Uganda.

Il est difficile d'imaginer une éventuelle collaboration entre cette coalition PARENA-SOJEDEM et les mouvements armés Hutu. Des sources très bien documentées semblent indiquer que c'est la SOJEDEM, par ces milices appelées SANS-ECHEC, qui serait responsable de la paralysie institutionnelle qui a suivi l'assassinat des deux présidents Melchior Ndadaye et Cyprien Ntaryamira, tous des Hutus, ainsi que l'épuration ethnique des quartiers à majorité Hutu et de l'université.

À Arusha, l'ancien dictateur Bagaza participe aux négociations de paix sur le Burundi par le biais de deux délégations distinctes: une délégation à titre d'ancien chef de l'État, et une autre délégation à titre de leader d'un parti politique, le PARENA. Une fois que la branche armée de son mouvement sera officialisée, Bagaza aura un autre avantage d'être invité aux discussions informelles, généralement secrètes, que le médiateur et une équipe restreinte a l'habitude de tenir avec les groupes armés, à savoir: le gouvernement (armée burundaise), le CNDD, le FROLINA et le PALIPEHUTU. Ces discussions informelles touchent généralement des propositions concrètes en rapport avec les forces de défense et de sécurité, et un éventuel accord pour un cessez-le feu permanent.

Great Lakes: IRIN Update 82, 01/20/97

U N I T E D N A T I O N S
Department of Humanitarian Affairs
Integrated Regional Information Network

Tel: +254 2 622147
Fax: +254 2 622129
e-mail: irin@dha.unon.org

IRIN Emergency Update No.82 on the Great Lakes (Saturday-Monday 18-20 January 1997)

# Gunmen killed three Spanish nationals working for Medecins du Monde-Spain (MDM) in Ruhengeri, northwestern Rwanda on 18 January. Reuters reported that the killers checked the passports of the victims, two men and a woman, and then shot them through the head. Assaults also left three Rwandan soldiers dead and a US national, who also worked for MDM, severely injured. Rwandan authorities told AFP that an unspecified number of attackers set upon the headquarters of MSF-Holland, but were repulsed by security forces. Then they attacked the compound containing MDM, Save the Children, and finally the military camp of Muhoza. Major Wilson Rutayisire of Rwanda's information office told AFP that grenades, rockets and machine-guns were heard in the battle.

The attackers are alleged to be members of the Hutu ex-FAR and Interahamwe, who were apparently looking for cash and medical supplies. However, humanitarian sources commented that the attackers had left cash and portable computers on the premises when they fled. AFP said that the attackers had all escaped into the countryside. A former ex-FAR corporal who worked as a security officer for MDM was arrested after the assailants reportedly shouted his name during the attack. MDM announced in a communique that it was suspending its activities in Rwanda "until the circumstances of this tragedy are cleared up." Some expatriate humanitarian workers have been temporarily removed from the area pending the outcome of NGO/UN/government meetings to discuss security.

Although Gisenyi prefecture is considered a particularly high-risk area the attack was the worst carried out against aid agencies in the region. Several expatriate workers in Rwanda feel that humanitarian agencies have been specifically targeted in order to drive them out of the area. Most of the recent attacks, which are attributed to members of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, have been concentrated in the provinces of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, which borders on Zaire and is home to several thousand Hutu returnees.

On January 11, a hospital in Kabaya was attacked and its pharmacy pillaged by a militia force of some 60 men. Three Rwandans were killed and another three were injured in the incident, and two foreign surgeons working with MSF received death threats. The following day, 12 Rwandans were killed by militiamen outside Giciyi. In the same area, grenades were thrown at a construction truck owned by a Chinese company engaged in road repairs. On 13 January, armed Hutu men beat, robbed and threatened to kill UN human rights observers working in the area. A witness told Reuters that when the human rights observers were beaten up on Monday, more than 100 local people stood around laughing and clapping their hands in encouragement.

# AFP and Burundi radio reported that Burundi's intelligence services arrested and were searching the homes of former president Jean-Baptiste Bagaza and other leading Tutsis on 19 January. The arrests come after several radical Tutsi leaders spoke out against Burundi's military leader Major Pierre Buyoya in recent weeks. Bagaza, who is regarded by many observers as a Tutsi extremist, was president from 1976 until he was displaced by Buyoya in a 1987 military coup. On Monday, Burundian authorities announced that Bagaza had been placed under house arrest.

Bagaza has been outspoken in his criticism of both the coup, stating that it would not resolve Burundi's problems, and the military's choice of Buyoya as leader. A spokesperson for Bagaza told AFP that other Tutsis arrested included Bagaza's nephew Innocent Sabiyumva, Colonel Pascal Ntako, and Deo Niyonzima. Deo Niyonzima, formerly a Dominican monk, is the head of the organization Youth Solidarity for the Defence of the Minorities (SOJEDEM), a radical Tutsi movement influential among young Tutsis. On Friday, the intelligence service was also reported to have held 22 members of the SOJEDEM executive committee for questioning. No arrests were reported in Hutu circles.

On 17 January, a spokesperson for the main Hutu-dominated movement in Burundi, National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD), claimed that Buyoya's regime has killed nearly 40,000 civilians since it seized power in July 1996, reported AFP.

CNDD charge that over 3,000 civilians have been killed by the Tutsi-dominated army in Kayanza province alone since December 1996. Religious sources gave AFP similar estimates of civilians killed as a result of army operations against Hutu rebels in Kayanza province. The region's military commander denied the figure, saying only 30 people had died.

# In a 16 January press conference, following his tour of rebel held towns, Laurent-Desire Kabila told AFP that more than 60 people were killed over the last week in skirmishes between Zairian troops (FAZ) and Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Zaire (ADFL) rebels near Lubutu in eastern Zaire. He further claimed that 50 FAZ and two white mercenaries were among those killed. Kabila added that his number two, Andre Ngandu Kisase, who has been absent from the scene since early January, had been wounded in an ambush but did not provide any further details. A security source in the region told Reuters that Kisase had actually been killed by Mai-Mai in an ambush near Butembo on 8 January. There has been no independent confirmation of this story.

Kabila's press conference also included a message to FAZ forces that a military coup to overthrow the Kinshasa government would be detrimental to Zaire, resulting in her "Balkanization".

# In a move that analysts attribute to the recent renewal of fighting between rebel and Zairian forces (FAZ)and the threatened counter-offensive, ADFL forces have tightened controls and clamped down on communication between Goma and the outside world.

# UN sources said that two additional way stations have been opened in rebel held territory at Karuba and Kilolwire, located 17 km west and 35 km north of Sake. These way stations were opened to assist Rwandan refugees stranded in the Masisi area as a result of the prevailing insecurity.

# Doctor Abdou Moudi, a WHO official in Kinshasa, informed the international community that a cholera epidemic was evolving in Tingi-Tingi, said Reuters. He said some 56 cases have already been diagnosed among the refugees.

# On 15 January, Honore Ngbanda the president's security advisor told Zairian state radio that rumours in the national and international press that Mobutu was to undergo fresh surgery for cancer, were based on malicious political speculation. He said that the doctors were happy with the results of Mobutu's medical tests and following a few days rest he was expected to return to Zaire. However, Reuters reported that Mobutu was once again admitted to hospital on Saturday. Members of his entourage refused to comment on this latest admission.

# AFP reported that authorities in Zaire have ordered the re-registration of all vehicles, estimated at around 363,000, in a campaign to counter the widespread thefts, which occurred during the 1991 and 1993 looting of Kinshasa. The re-registration which costs $126 US is expected to bring nearly 300 million dollars into the public coffers.

# In Arusha, Tanzania, British reporter Lindsey Hilsum testified before the UN International Tribunal at the trial of the first defendant Jean-Paul Akayesu, former mayor of the central Rwandan town of Taba. Hilsum, a freelance journalist, testified as to the horrors she had witnessed as the 1994 massacres began. According to AFP, Hilsum's testimony was aimed at establishing that mass killings that taken place as part of widespread plan of genocide against those of Tutsi ethnicity.

# A third suspect in the Rwandan genocide trials, Francois Bizimutima received the death sentence on Friday. According to a Reuters report, the first two defendants to receive the death penalty, Deogratias Bizimana and Egide Gatanaze, filed appeals on 16 January within the statutory 15-day deadline. Under Rwanda's Genocide Law passed in 1996, those convicted must file an appeal within 15 days of conviction and it must be heard within three months by the Court of Appeal. If the sentences are upheld, the two men face execution by firing squad.

# According to an AFP report, a government delegation from Rwanda's ongoing war crimes tribunal was expected to arrive in South Africa on 19 January to discuss possible areas of cooperation between the Rwandan tribunal and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC, which was established to probe into human rights abuses committed during South Africa's political struggle is empowered to grant reparations to the victims as well as amnesty or indemnity from prosecution to perpetrators who confess their crimes.

A previous visit to Kigali in September 1996 by a delegation from the South African TRC assisted Rwanda in formulating a reparation policy to deal with the victims of the 1994 genocide.

# According to AFP, a government Information Bulletin issued 16 January gives Ugandan public leaders, "from the president to heads of departments, chairpersons of local councils and even school heads," until January 31 to declare their wealth or face disciplinary action. The order is in line with the parliamentary Leadership Code Statute passed in 1992 in response to public concern over alleged corruption and other malpractice in government.

# At least 100 people living in the north of Kitgum district, Uganda, are estimatedto have been killed and 20,000 people displaced from their homes followingattacks by the Lords Resistance Army. Displaced people from Lokung, about 15 km south of the border with Sudan, first began arriving in Kitgum town on 11 January. Individuals interviewed by aid workers said that LRA rebels had arrived in Lokung and distributed leaflets ordering them to leave their homes for Kitgum. They then began killing people and burning their homes and granaries.

As of 16 January the local authorities estimated that there were 10,000 displaced people living in Kitgum town, with another 5,000 near Palabek and 5,000 more in the area between Lokung and Padibe. However, LRA attacks near Palabek were reported to be continuing last Thursday. In a Kitgum hospital there are patients suffering from severe wounds received during the attacks. Several patients had head wounds where they had been beaten with axes. The hospital is supported by AVSI.

Although Kitgum has experienced abductions in recent months as well as insecurity arising from LRA rebels passing through the district, such killings and large-scale displacement have until now been focussed on Gulu district to the west. These attacks have prompted debate as to whether the LRA is now increasingly targeting Kitgum and seeking to control a stretch of territory in the north of the district.

Nairobi, 20 January 1997, 17:15 gmt [ENDS]

[Via the UN DHA Integrated Regional Information Network. The material contained in this communication may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or its agencies. UN DHA IRIN Tel: +254 2 622123 Fax: +254 2 622129 e-mail: irin@dha.unon.org for more information. If you re-print, copy, archive or re-post this item, please retain this credit and disclaimer.]

Date: Mon, 20 Jan 1997 20:10:48 +0300 From: UN DHA IRIN - Great Lakes <irin@dha.unon.org> Subject: Great Lakes: IRIN Update 82 for Jan 1997 97.1.20 Message-Id: <Pine.LNX.3.91.970120200331.5980A-100000@dha.unon.org>

Editor: Dr. Ali B. Ali-Dinar, Ph.D

 

UNITED NATIONS

Economic and Social Council

E/CN.4/1996/16/Add.1

February 1996

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fifty-second session
Item 3 of the provisional agenda

Introduction

1. This document is an addendum to the report (E/CN.4/1996/16) that the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Burundi will be submitting to the Commission on Human Rights at its fifty&SHY;second session, in accordance with Commission resolution 1995/90. This addendum covers the period from 1 November 1995 to 15 February 1996 and gives a conspectus of the main current features of the crisis in Burundi. The Special Rapporteur reserves the possibility of re&SHY;examining later or studying more in depth certain questions raised in his report and the accompanying addendum.

2. The first chapter of this addendum is concerned with the overall situation in Burundi; the second chapter sets forth the Special Rapporteur's observations; and the third and last chapter contains his recommendations.

3. The highly volatile political background to current events in Burundi and the gravity of the crisis gripping the country prompted the Special Rapporteur to undertake a second visit to the country from 9 to 16 January 1996 in order to continue the fruitful dialogue entered into with the Burundi authorities and with the population during his first visit in June&SHY;July 1995.

4. He announced his intentions to the Burundi authorities in a letter dated 28 November 1995, to which they gave a favourable response on 20 December 1995.

5. During his stay in Burundi the Special Rapporteur had talks with the highest political, administrative, judicial, military and religious authorities. He also met the heads of diplomatic missions accredited to Burundi, together with the Secretary&SHY;General's new Special Representative for Burundi, who had just arrived, the UNDP Resident Representative, the delegate of the High Commissioner for Refugees, and the special representative of the Secretary&SHY;General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and of its International Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB). The Special Rapporteur also had exchanges of views with the members of the international Commission of Inquiry in Burundi, the chief delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), members of international non&SHY;governmental organizations, and various Burundi citizens' associations.

6. The Special Rapporteur would like to thank the Burundi authorities for their kindness to him throughout his stay and for the particular care taken to facilitate his travel and ensure his safety, with the help of the counsellor assigned to the protocol office of the Ministry of External Relations and Cooperation.

7. The Special Rapporteur appreciated the outstanding contribution of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Bujumbura to the impeccable preparation of his second visit to Burundi, and the numerous contacts afforded him among the Burundi authorities and population. The success of his mission is also largely due to the invaluable assistance in its organization and effective conduct provided by the acting Special Representative of the Secretary&SHY;General, who closely monitored the development of the situation in the country during the interval between the departure of the first Special Representative, on 10 October 1995, and the arrival of his successor towards the end of December 1995. The Special Rapporteur warmly thanked the new Special Representative of the Secretary&SHY;General for the cordial welcome he extended to him and for all the facilities that his office accorded him during his second stay in Burundi.

8. At Bujumbura the Special Rapporteur paid a visit to Pastor Johnson, at a dispensary which he has been running since 1946, on the outskirts of the district of Kamenge, and which currently ministers to the needs of some 6,000 to 7,000 Hutu inhabitants who fled the district, in particular as a result of the evacuation operations undertaken by the Burundi army, in June 1995. He also made helicopter trips in the provinces of Murimvya and Gitega to meet the civil and military authorities, the representatives of OMIB, and the inhabitants of a colline where Tutsis and Hutus live together. At Gitega the Special Rapporteur visited the town's prison and a Tutsi displaced persons camp set up not far from the headquarters of OMIB on administration premises. He had long talks with six communal administrators, who gave him a detailed assessment of the human rights situation in their communes. He also noted the normal degree of animation characterizing the town and its market on that day.

9. On the eve of his departure on mission and upon the completion of his assignment the Special Rapporteur met, on 8 and 17 January 1996, the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva to inform him of his expectations and of his evaluation of the situation. On the way back from Burundi he stopped off in Brussels on the morning of 17 January to meet, at his request, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, the director of his cabinet and his closest associates. On 18 January 1996, in Geneva, the Special Rapporteur took part in an ad hoc meeting of the representatives of the member States of the European Union and gave a press conference to the journalists accredited to the United Nations. On the same day he attended the joint meeting of the three Special Rapporteurs on the human rights situation in Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire, convened for the purpose of exchanging views on the problems common to the region and determining areas for mutual cooperation. On 19 January 1996 the Special Rapporteur flew to New York, where he had an interview with the Secretary&SHY;General of the United Nations at the Headquarters of the Organization, followed by a meeting with journalists.

10. Later, while in Europe teaching, the Special Rapporteur took part in a round table held in connection with an information and joint planning meeting on Burundi organized in Brussels on 8 February 1996 by Concertation chrétienne for Central Africa and met the Directress of Human Rights Watch, Africa. He also took part in a press conference convened in London by the United Nations Information Centre on 16 February 1996 and in various radio and television interviews with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). He also took advantage of his short stay in London to meet representatives of International Alert.

I. THE OVERALL SITUATION

A. Preliminary remarks

11. The Special Rapporteur noted a marked heightening of the tension in Burundi since his first visit in June&SHY;July 1995. The armed gangs and extremist political forces subscribing to a genocidal ideology had stepped up their attacks against military and civilian targets throughout the country, with the result that the capital, Bujumbura, had suffered several months from frequent water&SHY;supply and electricity cuts, making the daily lives of the inhabitants increasingly difficult in the working class districts. The widespread insecurity prevailing in Burundi is compounded by the very tense atmosphere that reigns in the capital. During his stay, the Special Rapporteur's attention was brought to a number of tracts put out by Solidarité jeunesse pour la défense des Minorités (SATEDEM), an association linked to extremist groups of young Tutsi, such as "Sans Echec", calling upon the population of Bujumbura to revolt and remove from office the President of the Republic, a Hutu, by launching a new "dead town" operation. For their part, the Burundi authorities officially acknowledge that the country is in a state of war, that it must fight to win it and that "everyone must get ready to make sacrifices in the common war effort", as stated in the speeches delivered by the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister in presenting their New Year wishes.

12. The talks that the Special Rapporteur had during his second visit generally confirmed his impression that the escalation of violence observed in March 1995 had continued throughout the country during the previous six months, with the predictable consequences in terms of serious human rights violations. The frequent clashes between the army and the "assailants" or armed gangs continued to claim many victims among the women, children and old people. In the period between the end of October and the end of November 1995 alone it seems that 1,500 deaths were recorded. For the year 1995 as a whole, some estimates go as high as 10,000 to 15,000 deaths.

13. The conflict situation in Burundi is reportedly affecting some 600,000 disaster victims, whether refugees, displaced or dispersed, out of a total population of 6.4 million.  Some 200,000 Burundi refugees are apparently living outside their country. The number of persons displaced within Burundi is estimated at a further 200,000. Tens of thousands of them reportedly had to abandon their homes in 1993 and 1994 to escape the

massacres triggered off after the assassination of President Ndadaye. Over 100,000 people are estimated to have been killed since October 1993. These massacres of civilians, perpetrated among the Tutsi and Hutu communities alike, are apparently still going on. It seems that thousands of people are continuing to abandon their homes as a result of these massacres or from fear of new ones.

14. The Special Rapporteur felt deep concern at the renewed tension that was reported to him in Burundi during November and December 1995. On 6 November, an ICRC vehicle was reportedly attacked on the road leading to Cibitoke and

a local employee killed in the course of the incident. On 14 November about 450 civilians of Hutu origin allegedly lost their lives at Gasarara, in the province of Rural Bujumbura, as a result of clashes between the military and armed gangs. On 6 December 1995 a Belgian Red Cross ambulance reportedly fell into an ambush laid by "assailants" between Bujumbura and Ijenda when it was carrying a wounded soldier and two of his comrades; this incident resulted in two deaths. On the same day attacks by armed gangs were apparently launched against three districts of Bujumbura, including Mutanga-nord, a residential neighbourhood where the Tutsi and Hutu élite reside. Several houses belonging to Hutus were allegedly burnt down before the "assailants" were driven off by the army, which then continued its operations in the neighbouring collines. For the colline of Sororezo alone, it is reckoned that between 80 and 270 persons, mostly women and children, lost their lives. Following those attacks, some 15,000 people living in these collines reportedly fled and assembled at Kiriri, around the Monument of Unity, not far from the residence of the President of the Republic. It seems that the army came and dispersed them a few days later.

15. Lastly, after at least 10 grenades had been set off on 14 December 1995 at Gitega, in the dwellings of a number of NGO representatives, and another grenade explosion had injured two expatriates working for Action internationale contre la faim (AICF), the Special Rapporteur was informed that many NGOs had terminated their activities and withdrawn to Bujumbura or Nairobi, while several agencies or institutions such as the World Food Programme (WFP), the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees and the ICRC had decided to suspend for the time being their activities in Burundi.

16. Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur was informed in the actual course of his visit and later in the second half of January 1996 that the situation had become calmer again and that some improvements had been made to water and electricity supplies in the country, helping towards a modest upturn in economic, industrial and commercial activities.

17. During his second visit to Burundi the Special Rapporteur found, to his very keen regret, that little or no progress had been made on certain major issues relating to his mandate. In the political sphere, apart from some very recent timid steps towards dialogue in Parliament between the members of the Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) and of the Union pour le progrès national (UPRONA), some of the factions operating in allegiance to the two main parliamentary parties have apparently not yet dissociated themselves from the extremist activities of other political groupings or associations.

18. These same power relationships are manifest at the governmental level, where the very limited consultation between the country's two major forces serves only to aggravate the stagnation and paralysis gripping the entire governmental machine and thereby to accentuate the general malfunctioning that affects all the country's institutions. The constant antagonism between the office of the President of the Republic and that of the Prime Minister and the lack of cooperation which characterizes their mutual relations graphically illustrate this. Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur was informed at the end of his visit and during the weeks that followed of certain signs of improvement in the working relations between the President's and the Prime Minister's offices that might offer hope of more effective cooperation in future. The persistent presence of the Tutsi minority in key sectors of the executive such as the judiciary, the army, education, or the economy, including the Prime Minister's office continues without there being any effective sharing of its major prerogatives with partners from the Hutu majority. And the practice of appointing to the subordinate posts under a minister officials selected alternately from one community or another, depending on the political or ethnic connections of the minister concerned, aggravates in turn the tendency to governmental ineffectiveness instead of promoting understanding between the two sides. On the contrary, the tension resulting from this state of affairs gives rise to frustrations that bode ill for the future of Burundi, in particular within the Hutu community and among the Tutsi élite, who themselves are beset by feelings of insecurity. The end result of all these tensions is to deprive the country of democratic influences within the two communities, at the very time when it badly needs them to extricate itself from the present crisis.

19. The Special Rapporteur is convinced that the conflict tearing Burundi apart is of an essentially socio-political nature, masked by an ethnic confrontation. The present campaign of pacification conducted by the Burundi authorities in the country's various provinces is an encouraging sign betokening their will to re-enter into dialogue with populations who are often subjected to manipulation, who are denied any means of participating in the political decisions which concern them, and who are the chief victims of the excesses committed by certain elements in the army or the criminal acts perpetrated by the "assailants" or armed gangs. Nevertheless, this campaign must not blind us to the fact that those mainly responsible for the present crisis are to be found in the very corridors of power, at Bujumbura, and that the means of resolving this crisis are largely in their hands. It is up to the representatives of the UPRONA and FRODEBU parties to call a halt to the games of hide-and-seek that they play with such abandon, often through the intermediary of other, small parties, some of which are linked to various extremist groups.

B. Paralysis of the Government

20. Despite appearances, the participation of the UPRONA and FRODEBU parties in the Government has produced neither any true concerted action nor any cohabitation worthy of the name. In every Ministry the distribution of posts between the country's two major ethnic groups is reflected in a growing ineffectiveness which threatens the Government's very credibility and existence. Whereas the Convention on Governance of 10 September 1994, concluded between the country's main political forces under United Nations auspices, was to have constituted the cornerstone of this cohabitation, both sides quickly came to interpret cohabitation as being a mere mechanism for distribution of posts rather than leading to genuine power-sharing at the decision-making level in the political, economic and social sectors. Hence the very great difficulties met with in putting into effect the guiding principles of this Convention.

21. Meanwhile, the absence of FRODEBU from some key government posts reduces correspondingly the real scope of the powers conferred upon the President of the Republic and Parliament, which lack the means to exercise effective control over the policies put into effect by the key sectors of Government held by members of the Tutsi élite. Again, several ministerial portfolios are purely nominal and remain without influence over the process of decision&SHY;making in the sectors of activity assigned to them.

22. Similar distortions can be seen in the top echelons of the political parties. On the FRODEBU side, there are today fewer Tutsi representatives occupying high positions in the party. Several FRODEBU members of Parliament have left the country to join the ranks of the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD), to which a good many Hutu extremists belong.

23. During his second stay in Burundi the Special Rapporteur became aware that the Convention on Governance of 10 September 1994 was no longer recognized as a credible frame of reference by the partisans of UPRONA and FRODEBU, but served rather to provide a battleground for the opposing parties. He is convinced that the essential weakness of the institutions set up by the Convention on Governance is largely due to the participation of certain opposition parties such as "Inkinzo", the Ralliement pour la démocratie et le développement économique et social (RADDES), the Alliance burundo-africaine pour le salut (ABASA), the Alliance nationale pour le droit and le développement (ANADDE) and the Parti pour la réconciliation du peuple (PRP) which, though lacking any parliamentary representation, criticize the Convention and tend to serve as a screen behind which various extremist groups can intervene in the national political arena.

24. The Special Rapporteur was relieved to find that the "dead town" operation, of which he had had a foretaste in Bujumbura at the end of his stay, and which had been organized following the defection of the above&SHY;mentioned parties calling for the replacement of the President of the Republic at the end of 1995 and the strike order issued by the SOJEDEM and other extremist groups, had not finally achieved the destabilization of the country through violence and that the situation had remained calm in the localities of Gitega and Ngozi, despite the work stoppage observed on 15 January 1996. Before leaving Burundi, the Special Rapporteur noted the firmness shown by the Burundi authorities in stationing large numbers of troops along the main roads of the capital. It remains to be seen whether these recent developments mark a real turning point in the political life of the country or whether they amount only to a delaying action.

25. On the other hand, the Special Rapporteur was disturbed to learn that those same authorities had released, on about 10 February, the President of SOJEDEM and the President of the Conseil national du personnel de l'enseignement secondaire (CONAPES), who had been the originators of many tracts calling for the removal from office of the President of the Republic, after arresting them in mid&SHY;January and thenceforth detaining them at the Mpimba central prison in Bujumbura. He hopes this decision does not mean that the Burundi judicial authorities are renouncing their intention of taking appropriate judicial action against the distributors of illicit tracts prejudicial to State security and public order. The Special Rapporteur is also very surprised that the respective Presidents of PRP and RADDES, placed under house arrest during this same period, should have had their freedom of movement restored two days before the release of the President of SOJEDEM. He further stresses that these events are closely linked to the consideration of the complaint launched by SOJEDEM with the Constitutional Court, which must shortly decide the question of the unconstitutionality of the appointment of the President of the Republic, designated under the Convention of September 1994.

C. Bias and laxity of the judiciary

26. The functioning of the Burundi judicial system has shown little improvement during the past six months. The Special Rapporteur has been informed that the number of enforced disappearances and of arbitrary arrests and imprisonments has appreciably increased. Between the end of June and the end of November 1995 the population under arrest reportedly rose from 4,586 to 5,586 for the country as a whole. Apparently, only 903 of those detainees have undergone some form of trial and been sentenced, compared with 796 at the end of June. The percentage sentenced therefore seems to have remained stable and even declined slightly, from 17.5 per cent to 16.6 per cent.

27. The overwhelming majority of the 735 persons held at the Gitega prison are said to be of Hutu origin, as also are the 28 women detained with their 9 infants or young children in a separate facility. Women belonging to the other ethnic group are allegedly released immediately after being arrested. The Special Rapporteur also had talks with four communal administrators and teachers of Hutu origin who were arrested in the wake of the events of October 1993, with no arrest warrant in the case of at least two of them, and have since been kept in solitary confinement without undergoing any kind of investigatory or trial proceeding.

28. Meanwhile, several attempted escapes from jail, probably faked, which allegedly occurred during the period covered by this addendum are said to have resulted in the disappearance and physical elimination of a number of embarrassing eyewitnesses or of persons who took part in the assassination of President Ndadaye. Thus, during the night of 27&SHY;28 December 1995 two non&SHY;commissioned officers and two other ranks held at the Mpimba prison were reportedly shot by a prison warder when trying to escape, according to a communiqué broadcast on national radio. One of them was allegedly identified as a presumed assassin of President Ndadaye. The testimony of these various prisoners would, needless to say, have been very useful for the investigations of the international Commission of Inquiry in Burundi.

29. The Special Rapporteur notes that after nine months' debate in Parliament the bill to set up one criminal chamber per province, i.e. 15 in all for the entire country, has not been passed and that the Government has decided only to set up three criminal chambers, at Bujumbura, Gitega and Ngozi respectively, which were due to start functioning in January 1996. The judiciary has 446 members, including 381 judges and 65 government procurators, mostly Tutsis, who it seems are continuing to deal mainly with Hutu cases in the civil courts, but far more rarely deal with any criminal cases. In the view of the Special Rapporteur, this preponderance of Tutsis, however honest and competent the magistrates concerned, is not calculated to reassure the members of the other community as to the independence and impartiality of the Burundi judiciary. Moreover, the magistrates usually lack offices, typewriters and the basic documentation necessary for their functions, such as the Constitution or the Civil and Penal Codes. What is more, the Burundi Bar apparently has only 23 lawyers in the entire country to provide for the defence of accused persons, who moreover have no access to legal aid. The Special Rapporteur considers that, under such circumstances, the conditions for a fair trial are far from being ensured and that due process in Burundi is merely fictional.

30. It is to be feared that the impact produced by these criminal chambers on the accumulation of case files awaiting examination will remain minimal. At the present rate, it will take decades to consider all the cases pending, which reduces correspondingly the role that the administration of justice might play in the process of pacification and democratization of the country. It is urgently necessary for the judiciary to become aware of the responsibilities that lie with it in this regard. The President of the Burundi Bar Association has reportedly already got into touch with several foreign bar associations to request expert evaluations and various forms of assistance (see also E/CN.4/1996/16, para. 147).

D. Challenges facing the army and security forces

31. With regard to the numerical size of the security forces, limited to some 10,000 men for the army (not 30,000 as indicated by the Special Rapporteur in the initial report) and consisting of between 3,000 and 5,000 men for the gendarmerie and the police (see E/CN.4/1996/16, paras. 29 and 33), the Special Rapporteur does not wish to cast doubt on the realization by the Minister of Defence, his heads of staff and their senior officers of the grave problems facing Burundi, nor on their ability to analyse the evils afflicting the country. He has, however, serious misgivings as to the real impact of the orders issued by central command on the conduct of military operations in the field. He wonders to what extent high command has the demonstrable will to take account, in its operational decisions, of the new challenges of the present situation in which the army is often confronted with the Hutu rebels in the field.

32. The Special Rapporteur believes that, despite assurances received from the Ministry of Defence, the high command of the army and security forces is having unquestionable difficulty in controlling all along the line the chain of command of the army, particularly in certain of the country's provinces. Evidence of this is provided by the information that was communicated to him by the Ministry of Defence concerning the penal action taken between October 1993 and December 1995 against 307 servicemen who had committed grave offences ranging from participation in the attempted coup d'état of October 1993 to various acts characterized as excessive use of force, murder or attempted assassination, thefts of weapons and enforced disappearances.

33. In this connection, the Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned at the fact that after the clashes that occur in the country between the Burundi army and the armed gangs there are apparently hardly ever any prisoners and very few wounded. Whereas, in the case of the armed gangs and "assailants", non&SHY;observance of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law in the civil war now being waged in Burundi is a fact that he notes and deplores, he is on the other hand shocked to find that those same principles and rules, which are generally known and taught to the military, are not observed in the operational sphere by Burundi's regular armed forces. Burundi has been party to the Geneva Conventions (1949) since as long ago as 1971 and to the two Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions (1977) since 1993.  Consequently, the absence of prisoners makes the Special Rapporteur wonder whether systematic extermination of combatants is not the prevailing practice, in flagrant violation of the above&SHY;mentioned elementary rules and despite the patient educational work that the ICRC has been conducting with the Burundi armed forces for the past 10 years; following the events of October 1993, servicemen in the field and many civilians have been the target of particularly sustained efforts in this regard, through the medium of stage plays.

34. In this connection the Special Rapporteur was particularly shocked to learn, during his talks with persons belonging to the country's two main ethnic groups, that each side accuses the other of not sparing women, children and the old, whether it be that they use them as human shields or that by massacring such populations they can give vent to age&SHY;old, atavistic survival reflexes.  He condemns with the utmost firmness such attitudes, on whosever part, and pressingly demands that respect be shown for the right to life and physical integrity of the civil populations during confrontations between the army and the "assailants" or armed gangs.

35. The Special Rapporteur has again noted no significant progress on the part of the above&SHY;mentioned general staffs in grappling energetically with the problem of broadening the base for recruitment of young Burundi servicemen or gendarmes to the entire population, in all the country's provinces, and applying to it solutions that are both imaginative and practical. He nevertheless noted that recruitment by competitive examination was regularly organized in the country's 116 communes, but that for young people a career in the army or police had lost some of its appeal in recent years, owing in particular to the currently prevailing climate of civil war and also because the very uneven coverage of educational facilities in the country does not allow children to complete their schooling or go on to the secondary level. Moreover, the army holds out little prospect of advancement for young Hutus aspiring to a military career, since other, Tutsi candidates will rise to senior posts before them. Lastly, the army appears hardly competitive in comparison with other career prospects emerging with the beginnings of democratization in the country.

36. The Special Rapporteur finds it most surprising that the office of the Secretary&SHY;General for the Coordination of Security and Defence Forces, reporting to the Prime Minister, whose establishment he announced in his initial report (E/CN.4/1996/16, para. 36) should not yet be sufficiently operational and balanced in its composition in the situation that the country is currently living through.

37. Finally, in the opinion of the Special Rapporteur, it is absolutely imperative that the Ministry of Defence should take immediate steps to eliminate the confusion that exists between the tasks entrusted to the Burundi army and to the security forces, as also between the procedures governing the activities of the military and those of the police or security services. Until now the gendarmerie, despite denials by the Ministry of Defence, has been considered de facto as a mere extension of the Burundi armed forces. The gendarmes, who begin by serving for six or seven years in the army before being assigned to their new duties in the public order or security services, are apparently ill prepared for their civilian tasks of maintaining order in urban or rural areas. They allegedly apply to those tasks campaign methods which, while justified in defending frontiers, are in most cases used against defenceless populations and are akin to techniques of repression, "combing", deterrence or so&SHY;called disarmament of the inhabitants of a neighbourhood or a colline to maintain a psychological climate of tension and fear. In the view of the Special Rapporteur, it is high time for the Burundi authorities to consider setting up a civilian body to take supreme charge of the public order and security services in support of the judicial arm, with tasks clearly distinct from those assigned to the Burundi army. There again, the recruitment base for these public order and security forces should be fully representative of the country's various regions and of the Burundi population as a whole (see also E/CN.4/1996/16, paras. 33&SHY;35 and 157).

E. Collapse of the Burundi economy

38. The country's economic and financial resources are running out. Its main industries have suffered from the electricity shortage and are reported to be barely turning over, if they have not already ceased operating. The Special Rapporteur was informed that there is only a six months' working balance in the State treasury, out of which two months' funds have already been committed for the purchase of two large generators which have recently begun producing electricity. Some economic agents have admitted that the country's production apparatus is deeply affected. Insecurity in the provinces and the countryside has disturbed the regular crop cycle for a considerable period, leading to a dangerous fall in agricultural production and in the country's commercial activity. Burundi's basic food production is reportedly no longer sufficient to feed its population. Between 1994 and 1995 the yield of a cash crop such as coffee fell by half - from 35 or 40,000 tonnes to 20,000 tonnes.

39. This climate of insecurity has developed within an already disoriented Burundi society, which ill perceives the aims of hasty democratization and modernization, which has lost its landmarks and which for two or three decades has been deprived of the traditional remedies offered by the customary structure. In addition, Burundi's creeping balkanization has affected populations, many of them used to living together for centuries, which now seem to have been taken hostage by extremist groups of every persuasion or disoriented by mutually contradictory official pronouncements.

40. In addition, numerous Burundi citizens are said to have withdrawn the equivalent of approximately 40 per cent of the fiduciary assets of the banks. Burundi, it is claimed, is on the verge of economic and financial collapse and will soon no longer have the means to pay its civil servants and soldiers. The World Bank has reportedly denied Burundi any further financial support unless the Government makes radical changes to its current policy. Furthermore, it is said that only one bank in Brussels carries out Burundi's exchange operations, while three major Swiss merchant banks, have temporarily broken off their banking relations with Burundi.

41. The Special Rapporteur was very favourably impressed by his contacts with a number of economic agents who are determined to participate fully in their country's economic management in order to promote economic revival and the establishment of a constructive dialogue between all parties, and thereby consolidate peace, national reconciliation and democracy. He particularly appreciated the open&SHY;mindedness of those he talked with and their deep understanding of the essential issues at stake in Burundi, manifested by their refusal to participate in the mutual demonization practised by the two main ethnic groups.

F. The democratization process stalled

42. As the Special Rapporteur has already explained in his initial report (E/CN.4/1996, paras. 37-43), democratization is continuing in Burundi, albeit under extremely difficult circumstances on account of the widespread insecurity, the economic problems, and the dangers stalking those who endeavour to set in motion a dynamic of peace and reconciliation reaching beyond ethnic tension.

43. The situation of parliamentarians remains extremely precarious, in spite of the efforts made by the Inter&SHY;Parliamentary Union to sensitize the Burundi authorities to the tragic fate of those on whose behalf it intercedes and remind them of their obligation to safeguard the country's democratic institutions. It was confirmed to the Special Rapporteur during his visit to Burundi that some 10 parliamentarians had been murdered in 1995 and that on several occasions their relatives had been molested or killed and their houses ransacked or in some cases burned. Other parliamentarians are reported to have narrowly escaped death, though seriously wounded, or to have received frequent death threats.

44. At the University of Burundi the Special Rapporteur was able to ascertain that a number of indispensable measures had been taken by the new university administration to improve the climate at the university, to encourage Hutu students to return to their lectures or take their examinations, to restrict agitation on campus and to ensure the safety of university premises. However, although a number of official investigations have been initiated, the Special Rapporteur notes that, regrettably, no administrative action has been taken against the students responsible for the June 1995 killings, either to expel them from the university or to ensure that they are no longer hiding any weapons in their rooms.

45. Local human rights and development organizations, in conjunction with women's, youth and church associations, struggle against all odds to defend the weakest and to muster all the available forces to tackle the crisis, by taking concrete steps to assist the country's sufferers, without distinction of category. The Special Rapporteur was deeply impressed, at his meetings with women's associations, by the maturity and determination they displayed in addressing Burundi's crisis and pointing the way to solutions, both within their families and in the wider community. In contrast, he noted that human rights organizations were suffering more from the crisis and experiencing difficulty in closing their ranks to clear the way for joint action.

46. The Special Rapporteur would like here to thank the Ligue des droits de l'homme (ITEKA) for the reactions and observations it submitted to him in connection with his initial report, and which he has carefully read. He would like to continue his dialogue with the Ligue during one of his forthcoming visits to Burundi. He has also taken note of the various reactions publicly expressed by the UPRONA Party following his second stay in Burundi.

47. Regarding the report of the Technical Commission on preparations for the national debate on Burundi's fundamental problems, which was published on 29 December 1995 in Bujumbura, the Special Rapporteur wishes to convey his warm congratulations to the main author and his team of assistants for the high quality of their work, the honest and accurate assessment made in the report, the specific proposals it puts forward, the prospects it outlines for the organization of the national debate, and the timetable drawn up for the conduct of the debate. The Special Rapporteur sincerely hopes that this admirable synthesis will enable all Burundi's democratic forces to engage actively and calmly in the search for new forms of coexistence and cooperation for the good of the country and of all Burundians.

II. OBSERVATIONS

48. The Special Rapporteur cannot but reiterate the thrust of the final observations in his initial report. The dangers facing Burundi remain considerable and the situation in the country may at any time explode, entailing unbearable consequences for Burundi's population, uncontrollable mass movements within the country and at its borders, and finally to a loss of control or to a destabilization of the Great Lakes Region which would certainly be in the interests neither of Africa nor of the international community as a whole. To permit such a situation to develop would be to show scant regard for the responsibility borne by those directly concerned: Burundians, Africans - with the rulers of Burundi's neighbours in the front line - Europeans, and the other actors in the international community.

49. How long is the international community prepared to tolerate the piling&SHY;up of corpses to which the Special Rapporteur alludes at each of his press conferences? How long is it willing to allow over half a million of Burundi's six million inhabitants to number among the country's victims, displaced and dispersed persons, or refugees? The international community cannot permit certain elements of the Burundi army or security forces on the one hand and groups of rebels on the other - numbering probably from several hundred to several thousand individuals - to terrorize with impunity defenceless populations, to choose women, children or old people as their victims and sometimes to finish them off with bayonets or machetes, away from embarrassing witnesses.

50. As to the question of a possible genocide in Burundi, it is inappropriate to ask when it will occur, with the example of Rwanda obsessively present. First of all, there is no evidence that the events in Rwanda will recur under the same conditions in Burundi; secondly, what is mainly happening in Burundi is a rapid succession of deliberate criminal acts, committed throughout the country both by rebels and by certain units of the army, and from which both of Burundi's two main ethnic communities are suffering equally. In Burundi it would perhaps be more appropriate to talk of a genocide by attrition, whose scale is probably ill appreciated for lack of precise statistics on the number of combatants and civilians killed and wounded as a result of the ethnic tension between the two communities, the struggle for power, the clashes between the military and armed gangs or the reprisals of each side against the other.

51. The Special Rapporteur hereby warns the international community of the need for it to set in motion, at long last, a new dynamic of which Burundi is in desperate need, a coordinated and integrated approach to the country's problems, which he will take up in his recommendations. Although he has recently glimpsed some encouraging trends in that direction among the directing bodies of the United Nations, he cannot but express his deep frustration at the dilatoriness of the European Union in providing the funds promised for the deployment of the five first human rights observers in Burundi, despite the agreement signed between the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Commission on 9 January 1996.

52. The Special Rapporteur is convinced that any delay in the deployment of the observers threatens to deprive the European Union of any further opportunity to participate in the peace and reconciliation process in Burundi. For all the reasons already set out at length in his initial report and in this addendum, Burundi is on the brink of an economic and social disaster. It is imperative for the international community to speak with a single voice and act in accordance with the responsibilities it bears.

53. In this connection, several European Powers that have played a major role in Burundi's history continue to exert indisputable influence there, a fact which lays upon them a special responsibility to persuade the Burundi authorities to put an immediate end to the killings, massacres or displacements of population in the course of evacuations of districts or of rural areas. It is also incumbent upon those countries to intervene to prevent or even punish the crimes committed by the "assailants" or armed gangs, failing which they may be accused of blatant omission or of tacit complicity with those acts.

54. At the same time, the Special Rapporteur reaffirms to the Burundi authorities his desire to continue with them the constructive dialogue initiated with many often sincere and motivated governmental representatives. However, he cautions them in no uncertain terms against the grave and real danger of the situation in Burundi getting out of hand as the result of the widespread violence, the persistent impunity, the absence of any justice worthy of the name, and of a form of democratization where extremist views alone prevail. The drift in this direction also reflects a system of education and training based on the exclusion or non&SHY;participation of tens of thousands of children and young people, the growing impoverishment of Burundians as a result of the neglect of the economy, which is going to rack and ruin, and the climate of civil war which is deliberately maintained for the benefit of a few, whichever side they are on, but to the detriment of a genuine desire for peace and reconciliation among Burundians. As long as the Tutsi élite persists in its repeated refusal to accept certain lessons from recent history, to face up to the fact that the conflict's ideological cloak in fact conceals its essentially socio&SHY;economic nature, and therefore to share political power and the country's economic resources more equitably with the majority, the Special Rapporteur is somewhat pessimistic about the country's chances of survival as it stands on the brink of an unprecedented economic disaster.

55. The Special Rapporteur reaffirms his deep conviction that there will be no salvation for Burundi until it has exorcised its past and brought to light the full facts of the attempted coup d'état of 1993, the assassination of the country's first democratically elected president and the ensuing massacres. While indeed the international Commission of Inquiry on Burundi is pursuing this task with remarkable determination and courage, the Special Rapporteur wishes to point out that much of the paralysis affecting the administration of justice is due to the fact that the judicial system is itself intimately associated with the climate of violence and lawlessness which prevails in Burundi and is constantly fomented by the crimes of the Burundian army, of the security forces or of the armed gangs.

56. Finally, the Special Rapporteur urgently recommends the re&SHY;examination and even reactivation of certain conflict&SHY;settlement mechanisms painstakingly developed by Burundi society over the centuries, such as the Ubushingantahe and the Bashingantahe,  which might help to settle many local conflicts in the collines, sectors or urban districts within a framework that offers genuine potential for mediation, for calming passions and for controlling tension, thereby paving the way towards national reconciliation.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

57. Following his second visit to Burundi the Special Rapporteur wishes to make a number of recommendations to complete those set out in his initial report.

A. Action at the national level

58. In addition to the measures already recommended in his initial report, the Special Rapporteur strongly urges upon the Burundi authorities that they should:

(a) Publicly reiterate to the Burundi army and security forces that they will no longer tolerate summary or extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and degrading or inhuman treatment;

(b) Constantly remind the military and representatives of the security forces, by issuing appropriate directives, of the norms they must observe regarding fundamental human rights and international humanitarian law;

(c) Separate the missions entrusted to the army on the one hand and to the security forces on the other, by defining a precise and distinct set of responsibilities for each arm: broaden the intake and training base for both bodies by involving all the constituent parts of Burundi society, so that all the country's provinces are equitably represented;

(d) Undertake the indispensable reform of the Burundi judicial system so that judgement is handed down for all detainees awaiting trial, in conformity with national legislation and current international norms, and so that the known perpetrators of massacres, killings or other acts of violence are prosecuted, arrested and brought before the courts;

(e) Restore confidence in the Burundi judicial system by, for example, restudying and reactivating the traditional institutions of the Ubushingantahe and the Bashingantahe;

(f) Reform primary and secondary education so as to facilitate access by all children and young people from all the social strata of Burundi's population to primary school, secondary school or technical education, and university;

(g) Actively combat proliferation, trade in and sale of arms in Burundi and enact laws strictly regulating their use;

(h) Refrain in official speeches from using any language that incites to violence and ethnic hatred and from propagating a message suggesting that war is the only recourse left to Burundians for solving the country's problems;

(i) Discourage any temptation among the country's élites, the political parties, the army and the security forces to resort to force as a means of gaining power;

(j) Ensure, by energetic and effective measures, that the press and the media comply with their code of professional ethics and behave in such a way as to strengthen the ongoing democratization of Burundi rather than to undermine it;

(k) Press ahead with the national debate, subsequent to the report published by the Technical Commission on the matter at the end of December 1995, and draw therefrom lessons conducive to genuine and effective implementation of the 1994 Convention on Governance by accepting a sharing of political and economic power in the light of the result of the June 1993 ballot;

(l) Take the necessary measures, with the support in particular of the Centre for Human Rights, to develop national institutions and infrastructure for the promotion and protection of human rights;

(m) Support, with the assistance inter alia of the Centre for Human Rights, the development of the operational capacity of local and national NGOs and the media, with the aim, in particular of fostering throughout Burundi a culture of human rights, reconciliation and peace;

(n) Take steps to incorporate, with the support in particular of the Centre for Human Rights, the human rights dimension into the training programmes of the Burundian army and security forces and the Ministry of Education.

B. Action at the international level

59. It is imperative that the international community speak with a single voice in order to address a clear and coherent message to the Burundi authorities and to make them understand that it will not tolerate for a moment longer the present deplorable situation in Burundi. Were this uncompromising language to fall on deaf ears or not to bring about the hoped for results, the international community would reserve the right to adopt appropriate measures or sanctions against Burundi, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

60. It is therefore incumbent upon the leading actors within the international community, both in Burundi and elsewhere, namely the accredited States, the countries of the European Union, those of the Organization of African Unity, the Secretary&SHY;General of the United Nations, his special envoys or representatives and the Security Council, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and his office at Bujumbura, together with the various agencies of the United Nations system operating in Burundi and international non&SHY;governmental assistance organizations or humanitarian institutions active on the spot, to agree very quickly upon a coordinated and comprehensive strategy addressing the whole range of problems currently besetting Burundi, bearing always in mind the present sufferings of the Burundi population and the concern for putting an end to them.

61. Such a strategy must secure close support from the Burundi authorities, and in particular from the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and his Government, as well as the armed forces, in order to help them restore the rule of law in Burundi and act in full conformity with the country's democratic institutions. In doing so, the strategy will be attentive to establishing a spirit of contractual relations and reciprocity between the Burundi authorities and the international community with a view to instituting a partnership conducive to results that are in the interest of all Burundians.

62. Furthermore, this strategy will seek to foster an intensified dialogue between the international community and the country's main political forces in order to settle differences and conflicts by peaceful negotiation, without resort to violence and war.

63. The strategy will also seek to combine the launching of the above&SHY;mentioned dialogue and the establishment of the rule of law in Burundi with a possibility of concrete reactivation of international loans and development projects focused on Burundi's economic and financial reconstruction, provided the Burundi authorities offer credible, tangible and verifiable evidence of progress in the problem areas of national life.

64. In the immediate future, if the international community intends to play its full role within this partnership, it absolutely must look to the strengthening of its operational presence in Burundi. This means, in particular, reinforcing the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary&SHY;General in Burundi and that of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at Bujumbura with officials of high calibre. Both offices have a decisive role to play in the strategy described above, each in its own sphere. In this connection, the Special Rapporteur was gratified to learn of the recent appointment of an envoy of the European Union in Burundi, who will also constitute an essential link in this strategy.

65. The other key element of the international community's commitment in Burundi is the immediate deployment of human rights observers, which has been awaited for months. In view of the current situation it would be desirable to send at least 100, if not more of them, in order to register and elucidate the human rights violations committed and, by their presence in all Burundi's communes, prevent their occurrence. The Special Rapporteur sincerely hopes that the activities of the observers will also help to ensure the effectiveness of the office of the Centre for Human Rights in Burundi and the development of greater synergy between the various forms of assistance provided by the Centre to improve the judicial system. In his view, the deployment of observers in the field should also be perceived by Burundians as very tangible evidence of the international community's commitment to efforts by society at large to achieve peace, national reconciliation and a return to normal life. The agreement of the Burundi Government to the deployment and protection of observers must be a permanent objective and one of the cornerstones of any partnership between Burundi and the international community.

66. With regard to the deployment of human rights observers in the field, one consideration that cannot be passed over is that of their safety, though we quickly come up in that regard against the limitations inherent in their function. It is therefore right that the international community, in deploying them operationally in the field, should consider availing itself, for example, of the assistance that might be provided by the military personnel belonging to the Observer Mission of the Organization of African Unity in Burundi (OMIB), who are appreciated by the Burundi population and generally well accepted by the army, and who could accompany them in their movements. If such cooperation could be developed, the international community should also commit itself to considerably reinforcing the personnel of OMIB, whose present strength is only 67, and to providing them with proper logistical and communications equipment, including arms to allow them to hold off attacks involving heavy weapons. So far, OMIB has been spending US$ 1 million per year to hire some 40 already old vehicles. It would be highly desirable for the United Nations Secretariat, and in particular the Department of Peace&SHY;keeping Operations, to consider providing the logistical support urgently needed by OMIB by reassigning to it all or part of the equipment that will shortly be released from several peace&SHY;keeping operations that are about to conclude.

67. One of the recommendations made at the meeting between the three Special Rapporteurs on the Great Lakes region (Geneva, 18&SHY;19 January 1996) concerned appropriate financing for human rights operations in countries under their respective United Nations mandates. They also considered that human rights must form an integral part of a global United Nations strategy. Accordingly, any political or diplomatic strategy designed to restore peace in Burundi should give high priority to the promotion of and respect for human rights.

68. The final component of this strategy requires drastic strengthening of the human, material and financial resources granted to the international Commission of Inquiry on Burundi recently appointed by the Secretary&SHY;General, which began operating in mid&SHY;October 1995, to enable it to advance rapidly in the implementation of its mandate. Particular attention must be paid to the safety of the Commission's members, to that of witnesses who come forward to testify, and to the specific measures required for the storage on suitable premises of documents collected and for their systematic analysis.

69. Clearly, if the expected outcome of the Commission's investigations were unduly delayed, the international community should seriously consider proposing the extension to Burundi of the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.

70. Among the sanctions which the international community could consider is restriction of travel abroad by Burundian leaders, the heads of political parties and their relatives, as well as by known rebels who advocate genocide.

71. Two other measures among those that could be suggested to the international community by the International Commission of Inquiry on the sale of arms are an immediate embargo on the sale and supply of arms to Burundi, regardless of whom they are intended for, whether Government or rebels, and freezing the assets in European or American banks of Burundians involved in arms traffic.

72. Finally, at no point should the international community renounce the arsenal of measures available to it under the existing international instruments relating to human rights or to international humanitarian law, including the possibility of resorting to force to put an immediate end to the massacres, killings and other serious forms of human rights violations in Burundi, which fall most of the time upon innocent and defenceless populations. Burundi is a beautiful country whose people desire only to live and prosper among their herds and their fields of cotton, coffee or tea, to fish or develop their trade and industry and, perhaps, to rediscover among Burundians that small core of common virtues and values that enabled their ancestors, Hutu and Tutsi alike, to live together for centuries.

Notes

AI INDEX: AFR 16/014/1995 1 Setiembre 1995 Versión para imprimir

BURUNDI
Estudiantes, profesores y clérigos, en el punto de mira de la lucha por la supremacía


1. Introducción

En octubre de 1993, el mundo quedó horrorizado tras ver los reportajes de prensa y las imágenes de televisión que mostraban cómo eran quemados vivos unos 70 estudiantes tutsis de la escuela secundaria (lycée) de Kibimba, en la provincia de Gitega. Primero, una banda de hutus armados con machetes y otras armas de carácter no militar golpearon fuertemente a los estudiantes. Después, se llevaron a los estudiantes a una habitación de una gasolinera abandonado y los empaparon en gasolina, tras lo cual les prendieron fuego. La banda montó guardia en las salidas para impedir que se escapara ninguna de las víctimas. Pocas consiguieron huir, y en muchos casos padecían quemaduras graves y lesiones de otro tipo.

Ese mismo mes, los estudiantes tutsis de la escuela secundaria de Rusengo atacaron a civiles desarmados en la ciudad de Ruyigi, matando al menos a 70, entre los que había mujeres y niños. Según la información que obra en poder de Amnistía Internacional, los estudiantes recibieron armas de un comandante de la Gendarmería local. Los ataques contra los hutus y las matanzas a manos de estudiantes y de otros civiles tutsis en la ciudad de Ruyigi continuaron durante tres días. Entre los muertos destacaban miembros del clero local, como un sacerdote y un seminarista católico, Albert Rukarambuzi.

Al igual que en los casos de otras matanzas de civiles desarmados ocurridas antes, durante y después del mes de octubre de 1993, las autoridades de Burundi no ordenaron que se realizase una investigación independiente de estos hechos. Nadie ha sido puesto a disposición judicial en relación con las matanzas. La impunidad reinante en todo el país ha servido para convencer a otros homicidas de que no se les exigirá que rindan cuentas por los crímenes que cometan. Amnistía Internacional sigue recibiendo denuncias de que hay estudiantes, profesores y clérigos involucrados en la incitación y perpetración de homicidios deliberados y arbitrarios en escuelas y otras instituciones comunitarias.

Amnistía Internacional está preocupada porque miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad de Burundi y de los grupos armados políticos del país están sometiendo a los estudiantes, profesores y clérigos a homicidios deliberados y arbitrarios y a otros abusos. Los homicidios obedecen a motivos políticos y suelen producirse siguiendo pautas étnicas entre los grupos étnicos hutu (mayoritario) y tutsi (minoritario). Estos homicidios parecen constituir un intento por parte de los extremistas políticos de destruir el grupo étnico del que proceden sus opositores, por lo que implican la intención de cometer genocidio. Los políticos y las demás personas que luchan por conseguir la supremacía política sobre sus opositores, recurren cada vez más a las escuelas, donde la iglesia lleva varios años desempeñando un papel significativo, para perpetrar ellos mismos abusos contra sus compañeros del grupo étnico contrario y contra otras personas en Burundi. Varios grupos políticos del país instigan y recurren a la violencia en escuelas e iglesias para impedir que sus opositores lleguen a ser líderes o pacificadores.

Amnistía Internacional se opone a las ejecuciones extrajudiciales de personas desarmadas e indefensas o de combatientes incapacitados a manos de fuerzas gubernamentales, independientemente de si se encuentran encarcelados o detenidos, se han restringido sus movimientos o se encuentran «desaparecidos», y de si estas personas hayan recurrido a la violencia o abogado por ella; por esta razón, Amnistía Internacional trabaja para que se ponga fin a estas ejecuciones extrajudiciales. La organización se opone asimismo a los homicidios deliberados y arbitrarios perpetrados por grupos políticos armados contra personas que no participan en las hostilidades, como civiles desarmados e indefensos, o soldados que se han rendido o que han quedado incapacitados para el combate.
Todos los grupos políticos armados han reclutado para incorporarlos a sus filas a jóvenes, algunos de ellos sin escolarizar, aunque otros son estudiantes de primaria y de secundaria. Algunos miembros de las fuerzas armadas han proporcionado armas, entrenamiento y otro tipo de ayudas a los grupos políticos armados. Sin embargo, ni las autoridades competentes en materia de seguridad pública ni las autoridades políticas han tomado ningún tipo de medida para impedir que los miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad apoyen o toleren los abusos cometidos por los grupos armados. Consecuentemente, la cultura de la violencia y el uso de armas militares letales ha irrumpido en las escuelas. Según la información que obra en poder de Amnistía Internacional, los grupos armados proporcionan drogas a los jóvenes con el fin de disminuir su capacidad de cuestionar las matanzas y otros abusos cometidos contra inocentes o resistirse a ellos. Entre las agrupaciones armadas tutsis cabe destacar a los grupos «Sans échec» (sin fracasos) y «Sans défaite» (sin derrota). Los líderes tutsis han formado otros grupos que son considerados como pantallas para grupos armados clandestinos. Entre éstos destaca el grupo Solidarité jeunesse pour la défense des droits des minorités (SOJEDEM - Solidaridad Juvenil para la Defensa de los Derechos de las Minorías), encabezado por el fraile dominico Déogratias Niyonzima. Otros grupos de este tipo son la Association des forces pour le salut national (AFOSANA - Asociación de Fuerzas para la Salvación Nacional), y el Front de la jeunesse patriotique (FJP - Frente de la Juventud Patriótica). El principal grupo armado hutu es el Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD - Consejo Nacional para la Defensa de la Democracia) y su brazo armado, las Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD - Fuerzas para la Defensa de la Democracia), grupo encabezado por el antiguo ministro del gobierno Leonard Nyangoma. Están, además, el Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu (PALIPEHUTU - Partido para la Liberación del Pueblo Hutu), y el Front de libération nationale (FROLINA - Frente de Liberación Nacional).

El monopolio de la educación y, por lo tanto, de la capacidad de ejercer el liderazgo, ha sido el centro de la lucha por la supremacía entre las élites hutu y tutsi. Esto ha resultado aún más evidente durante el actual conflicto armado, que empezó con el intento de golpe de Estado realizado por las fuerzas armadas, dominadas por los tutsis, en octubre de 1993. Se cree que, hasta agosto de 1995, habían muerto unas 100.000 personas, 50.000 de las cuales en los dos primeros meses del conflicto. Muchas de las víctimas son estudiantes de primaria y de secundaria, o niños en edad escolar.

Han sido especialmente los miembros de las fuerzas armadas quienes han seleccionado a las capas educadas de los hutus como blanco de sus acciones, so pretexto de que están relacionados con los grupos armados hutus. Han matado a muchas personas y han obligado a otras a esconderse o exiliarse. Por ejemplo, el 14 de septiembre de 1994, las fuerzas de seguridad realizaron una redada en la que detuvieron a varios centenares de civiles de la etnia hutu en el barrio de Kamenge de la capital, Bujumbura. Se llevaron al menos a trece de los detenidos para ser interrogados con el fin de identificar a los sospechosos de participar en la oposición armada. Dos días más tarde, sus cadáveres, entre los que se encontraban los de Alexis Bandyatuyaga, periodista, y de Innocent Sindayihebura, médico, fueron encontrados cerca del aeropuerto internacional de Bujumbura. Otras personas han «desaparecido» y también se cree que han sido víctimas de ejecuciones extrajudiciales. Los llamamientos realizados por Amnistía Internacional y por una organización local de derechos humanos, en los que se pedía a las autoridades militares que tomaran medidas para investigar las matanzas y «desapariciones», no han sido atendidos.

Los hutus y los tutsis llevan mucho tiempo viviendo juntos y, a menudo, casándose entre ellos. Sin embargo, desde octubre de 1993, los dos grupos étnicos viven en zonas mutuamente hostiles, donde las bandas armadas de cada etnia realizan una «limpieza étnica» de la zona que dominan expulsando a los pertenecientes a la otra. Los ataques de las fuerzas armadas y los grupos armados tutsis han expulsado a los civiles hutus de las ciudades y les han obligado a vivir en el campo (donde se les conoce como población «dispersada» que prácticamente carece de acceso a la ayuda humanitaria o a servicios médicos) o a exiliarse en países vecinos. Por ejemplo, los hutus han sido expulsados de todos los barrios de Bujumbura, excepto dos, Kamenge y Kinama. Estos, a su vez, han sido objeto de «limpieza étnica» para expulsar a sus residentes de la etnia tutsi. Los repetidos choques entre las bandas armadas de hutus y el ejército han obligado a muchos civiles hutus a huir de Kamenge y Kinama. Las ejecuciones extrajudiciales y los homicidios deliberados y arbitrarios de civiles desarmados -particularmente de ancianos, mujeres y niños que no pueden huir a tiempo- suelen llevarse a cabo en el transcurso y después de los choques armados, junto con la destrucción de propiedades, los saqueos y la quema de casas por parte de soldados y bandas de tutsis armados. Las bandas armadas hutus, a su vez, han realizado ataques contra civiles tutsis (que a menudo se consideran población «desplazada» en comparación con la población «dispersada») dentro o alrededor de las ciudades o instalaciones militares. Este fenómeno prevalece en prácticamente la totalidad del país, incluidas las escuelas.

Amnistía Internacional publica este informe para destacar la escalada de homicidios por motivos políticos y de otros abusos cometidos contra los estudiantes y educadores desde octubre de 1993. La organización hace un llamamiento para que se tomen medidas internacionales para poner fin a los abusos, especialmente a las ejecuciones extrajudiciales realizadas por las fuerzas de seguridad y a los homicidios deliberados y arbitrarios cometidos por los grupos políticos armados. Amnistía Internacional espera que las personas que reciban este informe, sobre todo estudiantes, profesores y clérigos, expresen su rechazo a estos abusos. Deberían exigir a sus compañeros y a aquellas personas que ocupan puestos de responsabilidad en Burundi que tomen medidas para garantizar que las escuelas e iglesias permanecen libres de discriminación, tensiones y violencia étnica de origen político. Las escuelas e iglesias deben ser lugares en los que se pueda desarrollar un núcleo para la paz y la reconciliación que influya sobre la totalidad de la sociedad de Burundi.


2. Información general

Los estudiantes y las personas escolarizadas son objeto de ataque en Burundi desde que empezaron las matanzas periódicas hace 30 años. Cuando los miembros hutus de las fuerzas armadas intentaron derrocar un gobierno dominado por los tutsis en 1965, los miembros tutsis de las fuerzas armadas atacaron a los hutus de la élite social en todos los sectores de la vida pública de Burundi y mataron a miles de ellos. La mayor matanza se produjo en 1972, cuando miembros de las fuerzas armadas y civiles tutsis persiguieron a los hutus que se encontraban en las instituciones de enseñanza y a aquéllos que ocupaban puestos clave en todos los sectores de la vida pública. Se calcula que perdieron la vida más de 80.000 personas, la mayoría de ellas hutus. Durante y después de las matanzas, muchos de los supervivientes hutus de todas las edades huyeron del país, sobre todo a los países francófonos vecinos, especialmente Ruanda y Zaire, donde algunos prosiguieron con su educación. Como resultado de ello, muchos de los hutus que a mediados de 1993 participaron en las primeras elecciones generales multipartidistas en más de 30 años, ganándolas, y que formaron un gobierno liderado por hutus, habían sido formados fuera de Burundi.

Las matanzas, particularmente las de 1972, hicieron que los padres hutus no enviaran a sus hijos a la escuela, a la que percibían como una trampa mortal. Esto provocó que la educación, al igual que los empleos clave, tanto en el sector público como en el privado, fueran monopolizados por la élite educada de los tutsis. El reclutamiento de hutus para las fuerzas de seguridad se restringió fuertemente, sobre todo en el cuerpo de oficiales, que cuanta con muchos tutsis bien formados. A los pocos hutus que obtenían cierta educación formal se les negaba la oportunidad de continuar con sus estudios. Por ejemplo, en muchos casos, las hojas de respuestas en los exámenes eran marcadas para indicar el grupo étnico de los candidatos, con el fin de que la mayoría de los estudiantes hutus fueran suspendidos o no fueran seleccionados para una educación superior.

Las iglesias, en especial la católica, intervinieron para proporcionar una educación informal a los niños hutus durante las clases de catecismo, conocidas localmente como Yagamukama. Esto parece haber sido, al menos en parte, la causa de la persecución contra la Iglesia Católica durante la década de los ochenta, cuando se encontraba en el poder el ex presidente Jean-Baptiste Bagaza. La persecución se caracterizó por el encarcelamiento de sacerdotes y seglares como presos de conciencia, la nacionalización de las escuelas administradas por la Iglesia, las fuertes restricciones a las actividades de la Iglesia y la expulsión de centenares de misioneros de Burundi. Se cree que la preocupación internacional por la persecución a la que se sometía a la Iglesia fue una de las principales causas del derrocamiento del presidente Bagaza en septiembre de 1987. El ex presidente Bagaza retornó a Burundi a mediados de 1993 tras una amnistía general decretada por el gobierno del entonces presidente Melchior Ndadaye. En la actualidad, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza encabeza el Parti de rénovation nationale (PARENA - Partido de la Recuperación Nacional). Los opositores del PARENA lo han acusado de estar relacionado con grupos armados tutsis, extremo que PARENA ha negado.

Tras las matanzas(1) de agosto de 1988, el gobierno del presidente Pierre Buyoya, que había llegado al poder en septiembre de 1987, introdujo ciertas reformas, entre las que destacaba, por primera vez, el reconocimiento oficial de que se estaba produciendo una discriminación contra los hutus. El gobierno tomó entonces medidas para eliminar la discriminación contra los niños de la etnia hutu. Introdujo un sistema más transparente de calificar los exámenes, publicar los resultados y seleccionar a los candidatos a la educación superior. Se designó a más hutus como ministros del gobierno. Otras reformas, como el reclutamiento de más hutus en las fuerzas armadas, nunca llegaron a aplicarse en su totalidad. El intento por parte del gobierno mayoritariamente hutu que llegó al poder en julio de 1993 de aplicar ésta y otras reformas, entre las que destacaba la búsqueda de un equilibrio étnico en las fuerzas de seguridad y en los servicios públicos, fue objeto de oposición por parte de los responsables del intento de golpe de Estado de octubre de 1993 y del asesinato del Presidente Melchior Ndadaye y de otros altos cargos gubernamentales.


3. Homicidios y otros ataques contra estudiantes

Los estudiantes tutsis han utilizado armas adquiridas a miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad y a grupos políticos armados para intimidar, herir y matar a sus compañeros hutus desarmados. Los miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad rara vez intentan impedir estos abusos: de hecho, a menudo los han tolerado o han participado en ellos. Las autoridades gubernamentales apenas han actuado contra estos estudiantes.

El 1 de marzo de 1994, los estudiantes tutsis de la escuela secundaria de Musenyi, en el distrito (commune) de Tangara, provincia de Ngonzi, impidieron la vuelta a la escuela, que acababa de abrir nuevamente sus puertas, de cerca de 20 de sus compañeros hutus. Esta escuela, al igual que otras, permaneció cerrada desde el intento de golpe de Estado de octubre de 1993. Durante un ataque nocturno con cuchillos, un estudiante hutu resultó muerto y otros tres heridos. En un ataque, al parecer de represalia, llevado a cabo el 7 de marzo, los civiles hutus del poblado (colline) cercano de Musakazi mataron a un estudiante tutsi a machetazos y golpes con palos. Los habitantes de Musakazi huyeron posteriormente al vecino distrito de Kiremba, al parecer para evitar las represalias.

Al menos 15 estudiantes hutus desarmados resultaron muertos y otros 13 heridos el 4 de junio de 1994, durante un ataque realizado por estudiantes tutsis en la escuela secundaria de Burengo. Alrededor de las nueve de la noche, una granada de mano fue arrojada a un dormitorio de estudiantes hutus. Dos de ellos murieron abrasados y a 13 los mataron con barras de metal y puñales cuando intentaron huir. Dos horas antes, el director de la escuela y otras dos personas más sobrevivieron por poco al ataque de unos 10 estudiantes tutsis que les esperaban emboscados cerca de la residencia del director. Al día siguiente, el Jefe de Estado Mayor del Ejército, Coronel Jean Bikomagu, y otras autoridades de las fuerzas de seguridad y del gobierno visitaron la escuela para recabar información sobre el incidente. Posteriormente, 14 de los 41 estudiantes que habían sido detenidos por la policía judicial fueron trasladados a la prisión de Ngozi. Se desconoce si aún se encuentran recluidos o si se han formulado cargos en su contra. Otros estudiantes, entre los que se encontraba el líder estudiantil, fueron puestos en libertad. El primer ministro Anatole Kanyenkiko y otras autoridades visitaron también la escuela. Según la información de que dispone Amnistía Internacional, el primer mininistro dio instrucciones a las autoridades escolares para que facilitaran la vuelta a la escuela de los estudiantes hutus. En septiembre de 1994, una organización local de derechos humanos informó que personas ajenas al centro escolar instigaban a la violencia y que los estudiantes tutsis se negaban a someterse a la autoridad. Esta organización añadía que la impunidad de que disfrutaban las personas desplazadas del cercano campamento de Kyegwa, que habían participado en los homicidios de civiles desarmados, alentaba a los estudiantes tutsis a perpetrar actos de violencia.

Una persona resultó muerta y 44 más heridas cuando, el 3 de marzo de 1995, cayó una granada en la escuela secundaria de Rugari, provincia de Muyinga. Según el director de la escuela, Bernard Ndikumana, el ataque se produjo después de que más de 500 estudiantes de la etnia hutu huyeron a la vecina Tanzania el 17 de febrero de ese año. La información que obra en poder de Amnistía Internacional indica que los estudiantes habían huido ante el temor de se produjeran ataques de los soldados. El ejército realizaba entonces una operación que, según se pretendía, limpiaría la zona de miembros del PALIPEHUTU que habían atacado el cercano puesto militar de Giteranyi, matando a un soldado e hiriendo a varios más.

Los grupos políticos armados actúan contra personas y organizaciones que trabajan para reducir las tensiones y para propiciar una coexistencia pacífica en Burundi. Estudiantes y profesores figuran entre los seleccionados como víctimas de homicidios y de otros abusos. Por ejemplo, el 11 de junio de 1995, fueron muertas a tiros cuatro personas, entre las que había al menos dos estudiantes, uno de ellos hutu y otro tutsi, que acudían a una fiesta en la escuela secundaria del Espíritu Santo (lycée du Saint Esprit) en Bujumbura. Cinco personas más resultaron heridas, una de ellas de gravedad. La fiesta, en la que se reunieron ex alumnos y estudiantes de la escuela y sus padres, había sido organizada para demostrar que los hutus y los tutsis podían y debían vivir juntos. Alrededor de las cinco de la tarde, cuando la fiesta tocaba a su fin, un pistolero que viajaba en un automóvil, forzó su entrada al complejo escolar y mató a los cuatro jóvenes. El pistolero pudo escapar. Un antiguo alumno hutu, Alain Miyamitwe, al preguntar por lo ocurrido, fue rodeado y fuertemente golpeado por milicianos de Sans echec que amenazaron con matarlo. Los milicianos golpearon asimismo a dos miembros belgas del claustro escolar, el hermano Bob Albertijn, director del centro, y el hermano Alphonse Jacob. Al hermano Albertijn le acusaron de dar cobijo a bandas armadas de hutus. Un joven amenazó con matarlo si no le daba dinero, cosa que hizo. Poco después, llegaron al lugar unos gendarmes y realizaron disparos al aire. Algunos de los estudiantes llevaron a los belgas a la seguridad de un convento cercano.

Alain Miyamitwe intentó escapar, pero los gendarmes pronto lo encontraron escondido en un retrete. Salió con las manos levantadas y sangrando. Los gendarmes lo detuvieron pero, según informes, fue puesto en libertad después.

Ese mismo día, los actos violentos ocurridos en la escuela secundaria del Espíritu Santo provocaron la muerte de al menos 15 estudiantes hutus desarmados a manos de sus compañeros de la etnia tutsi en la cercana Universidad de Burundi, en Bujumbura. La violencia empezó cuando un estudiante hutu, Alexis Ndayisaba, el cual, según los informes, volvía de una visita, fue atacado con piedras por unos jóvenes tutsis en una gasolinera. Alexis Ndayisaba resultó herido en la cabeza. A su llegada al campus universitario de Mutanga fue rodeado por estudiantes tutsis que le exigieron que les explicara cómo le habían herido. Le acusaron de haber participado en los homicidios de varios estudiantes en la escuela secundaria del Espíritu Santo. Los soldados que montaban gu